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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
The EEC's Proposed Directive on Products 
Liability: A Call for Reappraisal in Light of the 
Model Uniform Product Liability Act 
I. INTRODUCTION 
European products liability law l is following an emerging trend," which makes 
both foreign and domestic manufacturers more strictly accountable for product-
related injuries. 3 This trend is spearheaded by the European Economic Com-
munity (EEC)! which has recently proposed a comprehensive products liability 
law, Amendment of the Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the A pprox-
imation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member 
States Concerning Liability for Defective Products (EEC Directive).5 This EEC 
1. Products liability law is the name of the area of case law involving the liability of sellers of 
manufactured goods to third persons with whom they are not in privity who sustain injuries caused by 
products that are defective. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 641 (4th ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as 
PROSSER]; D. NOEL & j. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL (1981) [hereinafter cited as NOEL 
& PHILLIPS]. 
2. Changes in Overseas Products Liability, Wall St. j., Aug. 4, 1980, at 5, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as 
Changes]'; INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, INSURANCE DECISIONS: CHANGES IN OVERSEAS 
PRODUCT LIABILITY 1 (1979) [hereinafter cited as INA]; REYMONT ASSOCIATES, IMPACT OF PRODUCT 
LIABILITY ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited as REYMONT]; Bodine, Industry May Face 
Product Suits Abroad, Nat'l L.j., Mar. 16, 1981, at 3, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Bodine]. 
3. INA, supra note 2, at 1; REYMONT, supra note 2, at 5; Changes, supra note 2, at 5, col. 1. 
Currently Belgium, France, Luxembourg and West Germany have laws which, in effect, hold manufac-
turers liable for product-related injuries without regard to fault in certain situations. For example, in 
West Germany pharmaceutical manufacturers are liable, regardless of fault, for non-negligible damage 
arising from death or personal injury caused by the use of their products. Gesetz zur Neuordnung des 
Arzneimettelrechtes, Aug. 4, 1976 BGBI I 2445 (W. Ger.). This approach contrasts directly with the 
negligence standard which is still applicable in most European and other industrialized nations. 
REYMONT, supra note 2, at 2-3; Hollenshead & Conway, An Overview: Internatronal Products Liability, 16 
TRIAL 50, 52-53 (Nov. 1980) [hereinafter cited as Hollenshead & Conway]; Young, Product Liability: 
Making Guinea Pigs of the British, The Times (London), Nov. 4, 1980, at 19, cols. 3-7 [hereinafter cited as 
Young]. 
4. For a description of the European Economic Community, see note 28 infra. 
5. 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 3 (1979). This document is an amendment of an earlier proposal 
concerning liability for defective products, 19 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 241) 9 (1976). The EEC 
Directive has fifteen Articles focusing on various aspects of products liability law. 
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Directive would apply strict liability6 to all manufacturers for all product-related 
injuries. 7 In taking this approach, the Directive would impose standards on 
manufacturers which are more stringent than those imposed by U.S. courts. 8 
Consequently, U.S. manufacturers that export products to Europe would face 
greater potential liability for injuries related to their products in Europe than 
they would at home.9 
If the present trend continues, manufacturers selling products in Europe will 
soon be subjected to the most stringent products liability law in the world. IO This 
trend in E mope toward the adoption of a strict products liability standard is of 
major concern to U.S. corporations. ll This concern stems from two major 
developments: (1) the dramatic rise in international trade in manufactured 
goods during the past decade,12 which increases the possibility that defective 
products claims will involve goods manufactured in the United States;13 and 
(2) the liberal European laws granting European courts jurisdiction over foreign 
manufacturers in transnational products liability suits.14 Manufacturers are con-
cerned that these two developments, coupled with the trend toward application 
of a strict products liability standard, will increase the likelihood that U.S. 
manufacturers will be primarily liable if product injury occurs in Europe. 15 
The current U.S. products liability situation differs greatly from the European 
situation. Originally, negligence was the sole theory of recovery in products 
liability actions. 16 Over the past two decades, state courts have applied strict 
6. Often described as "strict tort liability" because of its basis in tort and not contract, this theory of 
liability states that instead of proving negligence, the claimant must prove that (I) the product was in a 
defective condition when it left the seller's control and (2) the defect caused the claimant's injury while 
the product was being used as intended by the manufacturer. Orban, Product Liability: A Comparative 
Legal Restatement - Foreign National Law and the EEC Directive, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 342, 345 (1978) 
[hereinafter cited as Orban]; see also PROSSER, supra note I, at 656-58; NOEL & PHILLIPS, supra note I, at 
31-38. 
7. Orban, supra note 6, at 376-77; 22 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 4 (1979); A Liability Law's Bill! Has 
Business Quaking, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 10, 1980, at 52, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Liability Law's Bite]; 
COMMISSION OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, BULLETIN OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES - PRODUCT LIA-
BILITY SUPPLEMENT 11176, at 13-14 [hereinafter cited as BULLETIN]. See also note 26 infra. 
8. REYMONT, supra note 2, at I. 
9. Bodine, supra note I, at 3, col. I. 
10. REYMONT, supra note 2, at I. 
II. See INA, supra note 2, at 7; Changes, supra note 2, at 5, cols. 3-4. 
12. Lewis, Nationalism Is Straining Market's Economy, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1982 at A8, cols. 1-6 
[hereinafter cited as Lewis]. 
13. Hollenshead & Conway, supra note 3, at 50. The authors note that it is now the rule rather than 
the exception that a manufactured product will cross national boundaries. Id. 
14. REYMONT, supra note 2, at 6; Bodine, supra note 2, at 3, col. I. The study reveals that "foreign 
courts will have little difficulty asserting personal jurisdiction over appropriate defendants in a product 
liability case." REYMONT, supra note 2, at 6. For example, French courts can now assert jurisdiction over a 
U.S. company -once it contracts to sell manufactured goods to a French company.ld. at 14. Germany 
and Austria can similarly assert jurisdiction over a U.S. corporation if any corporate asset is located 
within their borders. Bodine, supra note 2, at 3, col. I. 
15. REYMONT, supra note 2, at I. 
16. The first American case to apply the tort of negligence to a defective product was MacPherson V. 
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liability, as enunciated in Section 402A 17 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 18 
to cases inyolving defective products with increasing frequency. 1" However, 
differences have arisen among states O\'er when to apply strict liability and when 
to apply negligence in products liability cases. 20 Thus, today American products 
liability law is grounded in both strict liability and negligence. 21 
Influenced by the inconsistencies in state law among states as a result of the 
varying use of strict liability in products liability claims, the L' ,So Department of 
Commerce drafted the Model Uniform Product Liability Act (UPLA).22 Like the 
Buick Motor Co., 217 N,Y, 382, III N.E, 1050 (1916), For in-depth analysis of the case, see R, PECK, 
DECISION AT LAW 38-69 (1969), For a history of the development of products liability in the United 
States based on negligence, see, e,g., Freezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors, 10 MINN, L. REv, 
I (1925); Russell, Manufacturers' Liability to the Ultimate Consumer, 21 Ky, L,J. 388 (1933); James, Products 
Liability, 34 TEX, L. REv, 192 (1955); Wilson, Products Liability, 43 CALIF, L. REv. 614, 809 (1955); Gillam, 
Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 OR, L. REv, 119, 128-30 n, 39 and articles cited therein. 
17, One commentator believes that U.S. courts rely almost exclusively on § 402A in all defective 
products cases, Corrigan, Products Liability in the U,S.A, The Fairness Doctrine, 9 INT'L Bus, LAW, 115 (Mar. 
1981) [hereinafter cited as Corrigan], 
18, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), 
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer. 
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the 
ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and 
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the 
condition in which it is sold, 
[d, 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (I) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual 
relation with the seller. 
19, Phillips, Products Liability Synopsis, 28 DRAKE L. REV, 318, 318 (1978-1979) [hereinafter cited as 
Phillips]. For a history of the gradual expansion of strict liability recovery against product sellers in the 
United States, see Noel, Manufacturers of Products - The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN, L. REv, 963 
(1957); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J 1099 (1960) 
[hereinafter cited as Prosser, Assault]; Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 
MINN, L. REV, 791 (1966); Keeton, Products Liability - Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a 
Defect, 41 TEX, L. REv, 855 (1963); Wade, Strict Tort Liability for Manufacturers, 19 Sw, L.J 5 (1965) 
[hereinafter cited as Wade, Strict Tort]; Corrigan, supra note 17, at 115, 
20, Bodine, Product Liability Bill Gaining Support, Nat'l L.J, Sept. 22, 1980, at 6, coL I [hereinafter 
cited as Bodine, Bill], While court opinions in nearly all states use strict liability language in products 
liability cases only ten states actually apply a strict liability standard consistently, Another fifteen to 
twenty states apply a "risk distribution" theory by which the product seller distributes the cost of all 
product related risks through liability insurance, The remaining states apply a mixture of negligence 
and <'ther theories, [d, For a detailed view of state products liability law, see Gerber & Conway, A Survey 
of State Products Liability Legislation, 17 TRIAL 92-97 (Nov. 1981) [hereinafter cited as Gerber & Conway], 
21. PROSSER, supra note I, at 641; Phillips, supra note 19, at 320, 
22, MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT, 44 Fed. Reg, 62,714 (1979) [hereinafter cited as 
UPLAj, See generally Rodman, The Changing Philosophy of Products Liability and the Proposed Model Uniform 
Product Liability Act, 19 AM, Bus. L,J, 267 (Fall 1981), The thirty-six page Act includes sixteen separate 
sections, each dealing with a particular aspect of products liability law, An analysis follows each section 
to provide additional insight into the process by which the drafters arrived at the recommendation, The 
Department of Commerce under the direction of Victor Schwartz drafted the UPLA for voluntary use 
by the States, 
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EEC Directive,23 the UPLA seeks to provide a uniform approach to products 
liability law24 by applying either negligence or strict liability to products liability 
claims, depending on whether the defect is a manufacturing defect, a design 
defect, a failure to adequately warn or a breach of express warranty.25 This 
approach differs from that of the EEC Directive which imposes strict liability on 
product manufacturers under all circumstances.26 Therefore, if the EEC adopts 
the Directive, it will be applying a fundamentally different approach to products 
liability law than the United States. 
Because the EEC Directive could affect all manufacturers marketing goods in 
Western Europe, a careful appraisal of its contents is necessary. This Comment 
compares the manufacturer's standard of liability in the Directive with its coun-
terpart in the UPLA. In the process of this comparison, this Comment reveals 
manufacturers' fears about the possible consequences of ratification ofthe Direc-
tive. Before making this comparison, the author outlines the history and current 
status of these two pieces of legislation. He then analyzes the basic responsibility 
of manufacturers and sellers to consumers under both the Directive and the 
UPLA. The author proceeds with this analysis by first discussing the general 
standard of liability applied by the Directive to manufacturers and sellers and 
then examining the component parts of that standard. This discussion includes 
an analysis of the definitions of the terms "producer," "article" and "defect." 
After the discussion of the Directive, the author describes the UPLA's approach 
to the basic standard of liability for manufacturers and sellers and examines the 
component parts of that standard, including the definitions of "manufacturer," 
"product" and "defect." Finally, the author recommends that the EEC adopt an 
approach based on the UPLA if the EEC wishes to provide a comprehensive 
products liability standard that protects the interests of both manufacturers and 
consumers. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. EEC Proposed Directive 
As part of a European movement to create uniformity in products liability 
law,27 the Commission of the European Economic Community2R began to exam-
Id. 
23. 22 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 3 (1979). 
[T]he approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the liability of the prod ucer 
for damage caused by the defectiveness of his product is necessary, because the divergencies 
may distort competition in the common market; whereas rules on liability which vary in seventy 
lead to differing costs for industry in the various Member States and in particular tor 
producers in different Member States who are in competition with one another. ... 
24. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,714 (Introduction). "The Model Law, if enacted by the states, would 
introduce uniformity and stability into the law of product liability." Id. 
25. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). 
26. 220.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 4 (1979). "[A]n equal and adequate protection of the consumer 
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can be achieved only through the introduction of liability irrespective of fault on the part of the 
producer of the article which was defective and caused the damage .... " Id. 
27. Hanotiau. The Council of Europe Convention on Product Liability. 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 325. 325 
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Hanotiau]. The Hague Conference on Private International Law, estab-
lished in 1893, initiated the European movement to coordinate the law of products liability on a 
transnational scale. This Conference, comprised of representatives from twenty-eight member states, 
deals with private international law issues. The Conference holds discussion sessions during which it 
adopts conventions on different topics. The member nations are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, 
Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Luxemborg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Arab 
Republic, United Kingdom, United States (which joined in 1964) and Yugoslavia. Reese, Further 
Comments on the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, 8 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 311, 
311 n.2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Reese]. 
In 1967 the United States suggested to the Conference that it clarify the troublesome conflict of laws 
questions that frequently arise in transnational products liability suits. For examples of such problems, 
see generally Reese, Choice of Low in Torts and Contracts and Directions for the Future, 16 COL. J. OF 
TRANSNAT'L L. I (1977); J. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965); Kuhne, Choice of Law in 
Products Liability, 60 CALIF. L REv. I (1972); Note, Products Liability and the Clunce of Low, 78 HARV. L REv. 
1452 (1965); Nadelman, International Developments in Choice of Law Governing Torts, 19 AM. J. COMPo L I 
(1971): Hanotiau, American Conflicts Revolution and European Tort Choice-of-Law Thini<ing, 30 AM. J. COMPo 
L. 73 (1982). A strong desire existed among member nations for an agreement because certainty, 
predictability and uniformity of result are of greater importance in products liability law than in many 
other areas of tort law. Moreover, a convention could best achieve these goals in the international arena. 
A Special Committee of the Conference proposed a convention in 1972, delineating choice of law rules 
to govern international products liability cases involving member nations. For a more detailed analysis 
of the convention, see Reese, The Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, 8 INT'L LAW. 
606 (1972); Reese, Products Liability and Choice of Law: The United States Proposal to The Hague Conference, 
25 VAND. L. REV. 29 (1972). The Conference later approved the Convention, Conference de la Haye de 
Droit International Prive, actes et documents de la douzieme session du 2 au 21 Octobre 1972, Tome 
III, Responsabilite du Fait des Products, Acte final 246-50 (1972); English translation reprinted in II 
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1283 (1972); Reese, supra note 27, at 319-24 (Appendix). It has recently entered 
into force after ratification by France, Norway and Yugoslavia. 
In addition, the Council of Europe decided to study the product liability question in 1970. The 
Council was formed in 1949 to "work for greater European unity ... and to uphold the principles of 
parliamentary democracy, the rule of law and human rights," Statute of Council of Europe, May 5, 
1949. 87 U.NT.S. (1951). The Council now has twenty members, including all non-Communist 
European countries. Beginning in 1972, a subcommittee appointed by the Committee on Legal Coop-
eration convened to prepare a draft convention of products liability. It completed the draft two years 
later, and after careful consideration, the Committee approved it. European Convention on Products 
Liability in regard to Personal Injury and Death, done January 27, 1977, 1977 Europ. T.S. No. 92; 
reprinted in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 7 (1977). Generally, the Convention recognizes and legitimizes the 
expanding concept of strict liability for defective products which has evolved in the United States over 
the two past decades. After Austria, Belgium and France signed the Convention, now known as the 
Strasbourg Convention, the Council held the document in abeyance, pending the outcome of the EEC 
Directive on products liability. See generally Hanotiau, supra note 27; Fallon & Cousy, Developpements 
recents de la responsabiliti du fait des produits: les projets europeens face au droit beige, 1976 R. DR. INT. DR. 
COMPo 53; Note, Draft Convention on Products Liability, 23 AM. J. COMPo L. 729 (1975); Lorenz, Some 
Comparative Aspects of European Unification of the Low of Products Liability, 60 CORNELL L REv. 1005 (1975); 
INA, supra note 2, at 4-5; REYMONT, supra note 2, at 16. 
28. The European Economic Community consists of ten member nations: Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxemborg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. 
Vinocur, In Common Market at 25, Uncertainty Over Future, N.Y. Times, Mar. 21, 1982, at AI6, col. 4-5. 
[hereinafter cited as Vinocur]; Eder, European Legislators move to Increase Authority, N.Y. Times, Mar. 22, 
1982, at A21, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Eder]. For a general discussion of the historical development of 
the EEC, see D. COLLINS, THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1975); A. WALSH & J. PAXTON, INTO EUROPE: 
THE STRUCTURE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON MARKET (1968); H. MASON, THE EUROPEAN COAL 
AND STEEL COMMUNITY (1955). The governing body of the EEC consists primarily of four institutions, 
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ine various products liability issues in 1972.29 The EEC's objective was to prepare 
a document which would harmonize national approaches to products liability law 
and promote the free movement of goods while at the same time protecting 
consumers.30 Four years later, in 1976, the EEC Commission first submitted a 
proposed directive to the Council of Ministers.3! After receiving opinions from 
the European Parliament32 and the Economic and Social Committee,33 the 
the European Parliament, the Council of Ministers, the Commission and the Court of Justice. E. NOEL, 
WORKING TOGETHER: THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
NOEL). See generally A. ROBERTSON, EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS (3d ed. 1973); C. SASSE, E. POULLET, 
D. COOMBES & G. DEPREZ, DECISION MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1977). 
The Council, the EEC's chief legislative body, consists of representatives from each government of 
the ten member states. Id. The EEC regards the Foreign Minister as each country's principal representa-
tive to the Council; however, various ministers, usually experts on the issue in discussion, attend the 
meetings.ld. The Commission, the main administrative body of the EEC, consists of fourteen members, 
selected by mutual agreement among the member nations. Id. at 5. Throughout their term of office, 
the commissioners must remain independent of their governments and of the Council. !d. 
The Comr.1ission initiates the legislative process. Id. at 9. It proposes regulations, directives, deci-
sions, recommendations and opinions for the Council's consideration. COMMON MKT. REp. (CCH) 
~ 4900 (1978). Regulations are of general application and are binding in every respect, having direct force 
of law in every member state. !d. Directives are binding on the member states with regard to achieving a 
result. !d. The national authorities have discretion as to the mode and means of achieving that result. Id. 
The Council may address these decisions either to a government or to an enterprise or private 
individual; they are binding in every respect on the party or parties named. !d. Recommendations and 
opinions are not binding. Id. Once a proposal has been introduced, a dialogue between the Council of 
Ministers and the Commission begins. NOEL, supra note 28, at 17. The ministers present their respective 
national viewpoints while the Commission focuses on the interest of the community as a whole. Id. Often 
a proposal must undergo several drafts before receiving the Council's approval. See id. at 18-19. 
That the Council can only deliberate on the basis of the Commission's proposal greatly increases the 
Commission's leverage in the discussion. Id. at 18-19. The ministers in the Council, upon a unanimous 
vote, can alter the Commission's proposal in any manner they choose. !d. at 19. With only majority 
approval, the Council can solely accept the proposal in toto; they cannot alter it. !d. If less than a 
majority vote results, the Council has, in effect, failed to take action, and it must rework the proposal.!d. 
In essence, then, the Commission has the bargaining power and controls the dialogue with the Council. 
Id. See generally S. LIPSTEIN, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY (1974). 
29. Orban, supra note 6, at 375. Major reasons for this examination were the rise of consumerism and 
concern for independent and separate development in products liability law in almost every European 
country. !d. 
30. Hollenshead & Conway, supra note 3, at 52. 
31. Orban, supra note 6, at 375-76. See 190.]. EUR. Co MM. (No. C 241) 9 (1976). 
32. The European Parliament is composed of 434 members who are representatives of their peoples 
ratherthan their governments. Eder, supra note 28, at A2 I, col. 4; Vinocur, supra note 28, at A 16, col. 5; 
NOEL, supra note 28, at 3. They are chosen directly by the citizens of the member states and are seated 
and act according to political rather than national origin. Eder, supra note 28, at A21, col. 4. The 
Parliament's functions are primarily advisory and supervisory. COMMON MKT. REp. (CCH) ~ 4300 (1977). 
It fulfills this role by consulting with the Council and Commission on proposed actions. See NOEL, supra 
note 28, at 22. Often the Parliament submits questions to these bodies regarding regulations and 
proposals. Id. at 24. After receiving a reply, the Parliament often submits written opinions on these 
proposals to the two groups. Id. The Parliament's ultimate power to supervise the actions of the Council 
lies in the requirement that the Council consult it before enacting legislation. Eder, supra note 28, at 
A21, col. 5; NOEL, supra note 28, at 22. Until the Parliament submits an opinion, any draft approved by 
the Council lacks validity. Id. Its power over the Commission results from its ability to compel the 
Commission to resign as a body by passing a motion of censure. COMMON MKT. REp. (CCH) ~ 4300 
(1977). 
33. The Economic and Social Committee, a permanent part of the EEC appointed by the Council, 
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Commission modified the initial proposal.34 The Commission then submitted its 
amended proposaJ35 to the Council on October 1, 1979.36 The Commission 
chose to standardize products liability law through two approaches. 37 First, it 
created general obligations relative to all manufacturers and suppliers of defec-
tive products.38 Second, it based these general obligations on a liability irrespec-
tive of fault theory in hope of facilitating recovery of damages for consumers.39 
The effect of these two approaches is to introduce strict liability to the EEC.40 If 
the Directive is adopted, victims would no longer need to prove fault or negli-
gence on the part of the producer contrary to existing law in many EEC coun-
tries. 41 
Although originally submitted to the Council in 1974, the Commission's pro-
posed Directive continues to be debated by consumers and manufacturers. 42 
consists of 156 representatives of various sectors of economic and social life (e.g., trade associations, 
unions, farmers). COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 4942.01 (1981); ~ 4946.01 (1981); ~ 4945 (1981). The 
Councilor the Commissioner must consult the Committee whenever required by the law of the EEC. 
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 4942.05 (1981). It is also free to submit opinions on its own initiative. 
NOEL. supra note 28, at 5. An opinion offered by the Committee is not binding on the institution 
requesting it. COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) ~ 4942.05 (1981). 
34. Defective Products: Progress Towards EEC Directive on Manufacturer's Liability, Bul Some Basic Ques-
tions Still Open, 3205 EUROPE 13-14 (Sept. 10, 1981) [hereinafter cited as Progress]. 
35. 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 3 (1979). 
36. Progress, supra note 34, at 13. The Commission did not follow all of the recommendations which it 
received from the Parliament. !d. For example, it retained the principle of manufacturer liability for 
risks of harm not foreseeable at the time of production ("development risks"). Id. On the other hand, it 
did follow Parliament's suggestion regarding the Directive's scope to exclude farm and artistic products 
from the definition of defective product. !d. 
37. Orban, supra note 6, at 376-77. 
38. !d. 
39. Id. 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 4 (1979). Part of the introduction to the Directive declares: 
[A]n equal and adequate protection of the consumer can be achieved only through the 
introduction ofliability irrespective of fault on the part of the producer of the article which was 
defective and caused the damage; whereas any other type of liability imposes almost insur-
mountable difficulties of proof or does not cover the important causes of damage. !d. 
40. Liability Law's Bite, supra note 7, at 52, col. 2. 
41. Id. See generally Orban, supra note 6. For example, both the United Kingdom and Italy still place 
heavy emphasis on proof of actual negligence by the manufacturer. See, e.g., Donoghue v. Stevenson, 
1932 A.C. 562 (Seot.) (creating a duty on the part of the manufacturer to act reasonably toward persons 
who may come into contact with or may be foreseeably injured by the defective goods); C.c. art. 2043 
(Italy) (defining tort as "[a]ny intentional or negligent act causing wrongful damage to another [which] 
makes the person who committed the act liable to make good such damage) (translated in Orban, supra 
note 6, at 355). 
42. See Products Liability: European Industry Still Firmly Opposed to Some Aspects of EEC's Directive on 
Product Liability, 2840 EUROPE 15 (Feb. 2, 1980) [hereinafter cited as European Industry] for recent 
criticism of the Directive by the Union of Industries of the European Economic Community (UNClE). 
The Federation of German Chambers of Commerce rejected the proposal as unacceptable to medium 
and small size business. Lukomski, EC Product Liability Plan Hit, J. of Com., Feb. 13, 1980, at 8, col. 7 
[hereinafter cited as Lukomski]. Specifically, the federation criticizes the proposal for wholly ignoring 
the distribution as opposed to production function of retailers and importers by making them adhere to 
the same standards of liability as producers and suppliers of component parts. Id. It contends that such 
an approach would necessitate a significant increase in retail prices because many firms would have to 
take insurance against risks for which they have never before been held liable. !d. at cols. 7-8. 
The European Centre of Public Enterprises (CEEP) has criticized the proposal's definition of fault 
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Much of this debate has focused on the proposal's no-fault liability approach 
which holds the manufacturer liable for all injuries resulting from a defect in the 
product. 43 The Directive imposes liability regardless of whether tests would have 
revealed the defect at the time of marketing. 44 As recently as May 1980, the 
European Parliament called on the Commission to completely withdraw its 
proposal because of the overly strict standards to which it holds manufacturers. 45 
Although consumer organizations are generally pleased with the proposal,46 
they are nonetheless still actively lobbying the Commission to resist pressure 
from indust ry47 and to strengthen the Directive's pro-consumer stance. 48 On the 
other hand, manufacturers, specifically drug producers and automakers, are 
solidly opposed to the Act's strict liability approach. 49 They assert that the no-
fault approach will drastically increase the cost of insuring products.5o Due to 
lack of accord among the European Parliament, manufacturers and consumers, 
and its shifting of the burden of proof to the manufacturer once a consumer is injured. Product Liability: 
Public Enterprises Take Their Tum at Criticizing the European Commission's Proposals, 2852 EUROPE 14 
(Feb. 20, 1980) [hereinafter cited as Public Enterprises]. CEEP believes that the effect of the Directive is to 
place a guarantee obligation on the manufacturer, entailing an almost automatic payment of damages. 
[d. Consequently, CEEP estimates that an application of such an obligation on manufacturers would 
mean an increase of some 20% in production costs. [d. The British House of Commons has already 
debated the Directive and introduced a special defense for development risks. This special defense 
would allow manufacturers to plead that everything possible was done to make the product safe and 
that only subsequent use and technology revealed previously hidden dangers. Young, Product Liability: 
Making Guinea Pigs of the British, The Times (London), Nov. 4, 1980, at 19, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as 
Young]. 
The European Bureau of Consumers' Unions (BEUC) is deeply concerned about various pressures 
from industry aimed at seriously limiting and destroying the consumer protection purpose of the EEC 
Directives. Product Liability: Consumers Support Current Plans, 2871 EUROPE 16 (Mar. 17-18, 1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Consumers Support]. The BE UC interprets the Commission's proposal as a test case 
for the priority given to consumer protection by the EEC. [d. The BEUC believes that if the Commission 
succumbs to the wishes of industry, the interests of consumers in the EEC will be adversely affected.!d. 
In response to industry'S criticism of the Directive, the BE UC believes that equitably and logically the 
producer should be responsible for damage. !d. It contends that experience reveals the difficulty 
consumers have in proving fault on the part of the manufacturer. [d. Therefore, to ensure proper 
redress for injury or damage by swift, effective and inexpensive procedures, which is one of the basic 
tenets of the BE UC's program, is difficult. [d. The BE UC adds that the liability standard should not 
include development risks. [d. It argues that for the consumer alone to bear the risks of undiscoverable 
defects is not fair. !d. The BE UC argues for encouragement of industry to search for safer products 
through the imposition of liability for development risks. !d. Moreover, the BE UC contends that the 
inclusion of these risks into a standard of liability will have no significant effect on insurance costs. [d. 
Finally, it feels that the Directive should represent a minimum standard allowing member states to 
protect the consumer by imposing stricter standards if they so desire. !d. 
43. [d. 
44. See text accompanying note 64 infra. 
45. Hollenshead & Conway, supra note 3, at 57; Product Liability: The Parliament Asks EEC Commission 
to Withral" Its Proposal, 2914 EUROPE 11 (May 24,1980). 
46. Progress, supra note 34, at 13. The Directive also treats other areas of consumer protection in 
products liability law. See generally id. 
47. See note 42 supra. 
48. Progress, supra note 34, at 13. 
49. Liability Law's Bite, supra note 7, at 52, cols. 2-3. 
50. !d. 
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the status of the proposed Directive remains uncertain. 51 The importance of the 
Proposed Directive continues, however, due to the likelihood that the EEC will 
adopt a similar, if not identical, proposal soon.52 
B. UPLA 
Throughout American legal history, the federal government has generally not 
been involved in the specific details of the U.S. tort system.53 Instead, the state 
courts are the creators of U.S. tort law.54 In the mid-1970's, however, legislators, 
manufacturers and legal commentators began to fear that products liability 
insurance would become either unaffordable or completely unavailable unless 
lawmakers drastically revised the current system. 55 This fear was the result of 
rapidly escalating products liability insurance rates and manifest inequities which 
occurred when different states applied different liability standards to national 
manufacturers.56 Some manufacturers feared that the inability to obtain insur-
51. The Commission is presently reworking the Directive. Progress, supra note 34, at 13. For more 
information on the procedure by which a proposal proceeds from the Commission to the Council, see 
note 28 supra. Since January, 1980, governmental experts from all EEC member nations have been 
studying the amended draft. Progress, supra note 34, at 13. Since that time they have held eleven 
meetings in order to draw up a revised text for the Commission and Council; this text is, of course, still 
subject to amendment. Id. Recently, this group of experts has asked the Commission and Council for 
guidelines to resolve disputed aspects of the Directive. Id. Specifically they wish to learn member 
nations' views on: (I) development risks - whether the manufacturer of a defective product should be 
liable even if the state of scientific and technological knowledge at the time the product is put into 
circulation would not have enabled him to detect the existence of the defect; (2) eventual liability ceiling 
- whether total manufacturer liability should be limited by a ceiling; (3) material injury - whether the 
manufacturer should be liable only for bodily injury or also for material injury; (4) maximum or 
minimum harmonization - whether the Directive should provide for strict harmonization of national 
laws or whether it should create a minimum beyond which the EEC members would be free to establish 
tougher additional standards. !d. 
52. Despite the seemingly unresolvable conflict of interests between consumers and manufacturers, 
Rudy Portario, vice-president in International and European Affairs for the Johnson & Higgins Co., 
insists that the debates are over and that the European Commission proposal is virtually assured of 
ratification by the EEC, probably by 1983. Europe'S Product Liability Climate Changing, J. of Com., Oct. 5, 
1981, at 2C, cols. 5-6 [hereinafter cited as Europe'S Climate]. British industry and consumers agree that 
the EEC will adopt the Directive by the end of 1983. Churchill, EEC Liability Proposals Debated, Financial 
Times, Nov. 4, 1980, at 10, col. I. 
53. Schwartz, Administration Initwtives to Address the Product Liability Remedies that Meet the Problems 
Causes, 16 FORUM 711, 711 [hereinafter cited as Schwartz, Initwtives]. While from time to time the federal 
government has conducted studies concerning specific aspects of our tort system, the government's 
involvement in tort law has been rare and has never produced enacted legislation. Id. 
54. !d. 
55. Davis, Product Liability Under Section 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts & Model Uniform Product 
Liability Act, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 513, 514 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Davis]; Schwartz, Introduction 
to Student Forum on Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 113, 114 (1980); Schwartz, 
The Federal Government and the Product Liability Problem: From Task Force Investigation to Decision by the 
Administration, 47 U. CIN. L. REv. 573, 574 (1978); Schwartz, The Uniform Product Liability Act - A Brief 
Overview, 33 VAND. L. REv. 579, 579 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz, Overview]. Professor 
Schwartz was the principal author of the UPLA. See note 22 supra. 
56. Davis, supra note 55, at 539. 
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ance coverage would force companies out of business.57 In addition, they argued 
that this inability would cause manufacturers to hesitate to produce products 
which, despite their potential social utility, possessed more than the normally 
anticipated amount of risk.58 Finally, they argued that without adequate insur-
ance manufacturers would be unable to compensate injured parties who were 
granted judgments in products liability suits.59 
In 1976, in response to this unstable products liability insurance situation, the 
White House established the Federal Interagency Task Force on Product Liabil-
ity chaired by the Commerce Department. 60 After extensively studying the 
products liability insurance problem, the Task Force revealed through a com-
prehensive Final Report6' the unprecedented increase in products liability in-
surance rates since 1976.62 This Final Report chronicled how manufacturers' 
concerns over potential products liability claims had discouraged the introduc-
tion of new products.63 The Final Report concluded that although insurance 
industry sources had grossly exaggerated the number of products liability 
claims,64 inconsistencies in the application of products liability standards con-
57. Schwartz, Initiatives, sufrra note 53, at 712. 
58. Schwartz, Overvww, sufrra note 55, at 5'79. 
59. /d. 
60. Schwartz, Initiatives, sUfrra note 53, at 712. Originally President Ford's Economic Policy Board 
(EPB) instructed the Task Force to prepare a report on or before December 15, 1976. Gingerich, TIu! 
Interagency Task Force, Blueprint For Reforming Product Liability Tort Law in tlu! United States, 8 GA. J. INT'L 
& COMPo L. 279, 279 n. 1 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Gingerich]. The Task Force commissioned an 
insurance, an industry and a legal contractor to gather the basic data. Id. The EPB asked the Task Force 
to prepare an initial report indicating the scope and dimension of the potential product liability 
insurance crisis and suggest solutions.ld. The Task Force filed a preliminary report on December 15, 
1976.ld. The EPB then issued a modified version ofthis report on January 4, 1977. INTERAGENCY TASK 
FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABIUTY, BRIEFING REpORT (1977). 
On the basis of this report, the EPB mandated the publication of the Task Force's contractor studies. 
See THE RESEARCH GROUP, INC., PRODUCT LlABlUTY: LEGAL STUDY, Accession No. PB 263 601 (1977) (7 
vols.) [hereinafter cited as LEGAL STUDY]; GORDON ASSOCIATES, INC., PRODUCT LIABIUTY: INDUSTRY 
STUDY, Accession No. PB 265 542 (1977) (7 vols.); and McKINSEY, INC., PRODUCT LIABIUTY: INSURANCE 
STUDY, Accession No. PB 263 600 (1977). For a condensed version of all three contractor studies, see THE 
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABIUTY: FINAL REpORT, Accession No. PB 272 220 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as FINAL REpORT]; Gingerich, sUfrra note 60, at 279 n. 1. 
61. FINAL REpORT, sUfrra note 60. One commentator has called the Final Report "the most com-
prehensive research document currently available on the product liability situation in the United States." 
Gingerich, sUfrra note 60, at 281. 
62. Schwartz, Initiatives, sUfrra note 55, at 712. 
63. Id. While the Final Report noted that this problem had not directly caused large numbers of 
business closings, enough circumstantial evidence existed to intimate that skyrocketing insurance rates 
had severely affected many smaller business producing higher risk products. Schwartz, Overview, 
sufrra note 55, at 580. In both its Briefing Report and Final Report, the Task Force refused to declare 
the present product liability situation a "crisis." It did recognize, however, that "product liability 
problems present a potentially disruptive effect on the economy. More importantly, the problem is not 
amenable to simple remedies. It is a subtle problem in which the interests of consumers, workers, 
manufacturers, distributors, retailers and insurers have to be balanced." FINAL REpORT, sUfrra note 60, at 
1-2. 
64. For example, the Insurance Information Institute reported that there were approximately a 
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tinued to adversely affect the insurance system. 65 
In 1978, less than one year after the Task Force issued its Final Report, the 
Department of Commerce produced an options paper66 which recommended 
that the government prepare a uniform products liability law. 67 In response to 
the support from manufacturers and consumers which this report generated, 
the Commerce Department issued the Draft Uniform Product Liability Law. 68 
Public comment to the Draft was greater than anticipated.69 In 1979, after 
analyzing these responses,70 the Commerce Department formulated an 
amended version of the Draft, the Model Uniform Product Liability Act. 71 Since 
million claims filed in 1976. After more thorough investigation, insurance industry sources reduced the 
estimate to hetween 60,000 and 70,000 claims. Product Liability Insurance Hearings (Part 2) Before the House 
Suhcomm. on Capital Investment and Business Opportunities of the House Comm. on Small Business, !15th L:ong., 
1st Sess. 547 (1977) (statement of Mavis A. Walters, Vice President, Insurance Services Office). The 
Task Force also discovered that in the overwhelming majority of cases, insurance companies did not rely 
on data to support their premium increases in the 1974-1976 period; rather, circumstantial evidence 
suggested that some insurers engaged in "panic pricing." Id. at 552 (statement of Phillip H. Dutter, 
Director of McKinsey & Co.). 
65. FINAL REPORT, supra note 60, at 47, 1-27. 
66. Options Paper on Product Liability and Accident Compensation Issues, 43 Fed. Reg. 14,612 
(1978). Released on April 6, 1978 for public comment, this Options Paper had heen sent to the White 
House on February 24, 1978, with suggestions for the Administration on how it might respond to the 
product liability issue. It contained both long and short term suggestions for rectifying problems such as 
ambiguous insurer ratemaking procedures and unsafe manufacturing practices. For a discussion of 
these long and short term recommendations, see Gingerich, supra note 60, at 280-81 n. 4. 
67. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,714 (Introduction). As consumer, manufacturer, and insurer re-
sponse ensued, the Department of Commerce realized the large degree of support for such an idea, id. 
The Department of Commerce published a report containing responses to the Options Paper. Options 
Paper on Product Liability and Accident Compensation Issues - Synthesis of Public Comment, 43 Fed. 
Reg. 40,438 (1978). 
68. Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, 44 Fed. Reg. 2,996 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Draft]. 
69. The Department of Commerce received approximately 240 responses totaling 1500 pages. 
UPLA, .upra note 22, at 62,714 (Introduction). The Department of Commerce took special steps to 
bring the Draft to the attention of consumers. Id. Working with its Director of Consumer Affairs and 
the Office of the Special Assistant to the President for Consumer Affairs, the Commerce Department 
conducted consumer discussions in Atlanta, Detroit, Los Angeles and Washington, D.C.ld. In addition 
to these forums, the drafters met with representatives of manufacturer and consumer groups who 
expressed interest in the proposal.ld. The Draft was also reviewed at hearings hefore the Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Minority Enterprises of the House Committee on Small Business and hefore the 
Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce. Id. Interested government agencies also provided comments on the Draft. Id. 
70. Schwartz, Overview, supra note 55, at 714. Because the Act would serve as a model for states, the 
Commerce Department gave careful attention to existing state, congressional and private studies of 
product liability proposals. Id. In particular, the drafters paid close attention to the Product Liability 
Closed Claim Survey conducted by the Insurance Services Office in 1966-77. Id. This document, 
INSURANCE SERVICES OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABIUTY CLOSED CLAIMS SURVEY: A TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF 
SURVEY RESULTS (1977) [hereinafter cited as CLOSED CLAIMS SURVEY], provides a survey of over 23,000 
product liability claims. The Department also reviewed all major insurance proposals introduced in 
state legislatures in the preceeding two years. See generally UPLA, App. A, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,750 (1979). 
71. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,714 (Introduction). Along with the public comment and the Closed 
Claims Survey, the Act is based on the work of the Federal Interagency Task Force and its contractor 
studies. The Department of Commerce also conducted a thorough review of earlier case law and law 
review literature published since the time of the initial Task Force reports. Id. 
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that time Colorado,72 Connecticut,73 Georgia,74 Idaho,75 Kansas,76 North 
Carolina,77 Rhode Island78 and Washington79 have adopted various portions of 
the UPLA. In addition, both the U.S. Senate80 and the House of Representa-
tives81 are considering national products liability legislation similar to the 
UPLA.82 Thus, the UPLA has already inspired a movement in state legislatures 
and the federal government to unify products liability law. 83 Consistent with the 
original goals of the Interagency Task Force, the UPLA focuses on ways to 
introduce uniformity and stability into products liability law. Specifically, the 
drafters sought to achieve six basic goals: 
(1) to insure that persons injured by unreasonably unsafe products 
receive reasonable compensation for their injuries; (2) to insure the 
availability of affordable product liability insurance with adequate 
coverage for producers that engage in reasonably safe manufactur-
72. COL. REv. STAT. § 13-21-401 (1973 Supp.) (Definitions). 
73. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52.57m (Rev. 1958) (Definitions). 
74. GA. CODE ANN. § 105 (Rev. 1933) (Statute of Repose). 
75. IDAHO CODE § 6·1402-03 (1981 Supp.) (Definitions and length of Time Product Sellers Subject to 
Liability) . 
76. 2 PROD. LIAB. REp. (CCH) ~ 91,711-714 (1982) (Definitions). 
77. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-I (1979) (Definitions). 
78. R.l. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13 (1956) (Statute of Repose). 
79. 2 PROD. LIAB. REp. (CCH) ~ 94, 910-015 (1982) (Definitions). 
80. Young, Shumway Seeks Reform of Product Liability, J. of Com., Mar. 30, 1982, at 9A, col. 2 
[hereinafter cited as Young, Reform]; Geisel, Tort Reform Bills Open Strategy Debate, Business Insurance, 
Mar. 8, 1982, at 3, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as Geisel]. Senator Robert W. Kasten Jr. recently introduced 
a comprehensive products liability bill which was referred to the Consumer Subcommittee ofthe Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation in June 1982. See S. 2631, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., 
122 Congo Rec. S6878 (daily ed., June 16, 1982). See also Lewin, If a Product is Defective, N.Y. Times, 
April 20, 1982, at D2, col. 2 [hereinafter cited as Lewin]. The Subcommittee concluded its hearings on 
the bill onJuly 1,1982, and the bill is currently awaiting markup by the Senate Commerce Committee. 
Telephone interview with Wendy Morphew, Legislative Staff Assistant to Senator Kasten, Septem-
ber 10, 1982. Like the UPLA, this bi11 would provide uniform standards of liability for manufacturers of 
defective products based on both strict liability and negligence theories. For a complete text of the bill, 
see S. 2631 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 122 Congo Rec. S. 6847-51 (daily ed.June 16, 1982). See also Brophy, 
Who and Where do I sue?, FORBES, April 12, 1982, at 64-65. 
81. Young, Reform, sufrra note 80, at 41, col. I; Geisel, sUfrra note 80, at 3, col. I. California 
Representative Norman Shumway introduced the "Products Liability Act of 1982" to the House of 
Representatives in December 1981. H.R. 5214, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1982). The Health and Environ· 
ment Subcommittee of the House Energy and Commerce Committee is presently considering the bi11. 
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, LEGISLATIVE CALENDAR, 97th Cong., 2d. Sess., at 14, 272 
Uuly,9, 1982); see Geisel, sUfrra note 80, at 3, col. I. The major difference between the Shumway and 
Kasten bi11s is that the Shumway Bi11 sets a ten year statute of limitations for all goods whereas the 
Kasten bill proposes a twenty-five year statute of limitations for business capital goods but none for 
consumer durables, pharmaceuticals or other products. See Geisel, sUfrra note 80, at 9A, cols. 1-2. 
82. For a general discussion of the recent spate of national products liability proposals, see generally 
Lewin, sUfrra note 80, at D2, cols. 1-3; Fisher, Product Law Victim of Federalism, Nat'l Underwriter, 
Mar. 19, 1982, a~ I, cols. 1-4; Mayer, Liability Standards Split Administration, Washington Post, Mar. 13, 
1982, at I, cols. 1-2; PRODUCT LIABILITY ALLIANCE, BACKGROUND PAPER ON PRODUCT LIABILITY INSUR-
ANCE (1982). 
83. Bodine, Bill, sUfrra note 20, at 6, col. I. 
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ing practices; (3) to place the incentive for loss prevention on the 
party or parties who are best able to accomplish that goal; (4) to 
expedite the reparations process from the time of injury to the time 
the claim is paid; (5) to minimize the sum of accident costs, preven-
tion costs, and transaction costs; and (6) to use language that is 
comparatively clear and concise. 84 
327 
The Commerce Department realized, when it drafted UPLA, that these six 
factors would often conflict. 85 In creating the UPLA, the Commerce Department 
attempted to balance the various goals and interests in a way that would 
"stabilize product liability law and benefit product sellers and users alike."86 
The notion that products liability law is a branch of the law of torts pervades 
the UPLA.87 Underlying American tort law is the premise that the party which is 
culpable should bear the cost of an accident.88 Following this principle, the 
UPLA will not ask a manufacturer to pay damages merely because its product 
caused an injury.89 The injured party must establish fault on the part of the 
manufacturer through the offer of specific proof that the manufacturer was 
responsible for the injury.9o While the injured party may still receive full 
compensation, the UPLA requires a showing of clear and convincing evidence of 
fault before it will impose liability.91 The UPLA uses both strict liability and 
negligence theories to determine liability.92 
III. BASIC RESPONSIBILITY OF MANUFACTURER OR SELLER 
A. EEC Proposed Directive 
Perhaps the most crucial and controversial issue with respect to any products 
liability standard is the clear definition of the manufacturer's or seller's responsi-
bility toward the consumer for harm caused by its product.93 Article 1 ofthe EEC 
Proposed Directive succinctly outlines the standard imposed on a manufacturer: 
84. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,714-15 (Criteria for the Act). 
85. UPLA. supra note 22. at 62.715 (Criteria for the Act). 
86. [d. 
87. [d. 
88. PROSSER. supra note I. at 495. 
89. UPLA. supra note 22. at 62.715 (Criteria for the Act). "The responsibility should be defined in 
terms that everyone can understand. Product liability law should indicate why a particular individual 
product seller was sufficiently blame-worthy that it should bear the cost of injury." [d. 
90. /d. 
91. [d. at 62.720 (§ 103 Analysis). 
92. [d. 
93. /d. at 62.721 (§ 104 Analysis). "No single product liability issue has generated more controversy 
than the question of defining the basic standards of responsibility to which product manufacturers are 
held." [d. See also Epstein. Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground. 56 N.C.L. REV. 643 (1973); 
Vetri. Products Liability: The Developing Fra7T1l!workfor Analysis. 54 OR. L. REV. 293. 310 (1975) [hereinafter 
cited as Vetri]; Henderson. Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choice: The Limits of 
Adjudication. 73 COL. L. REV. 1531 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Henderson]. 
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"[t]he producer of an article shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in the 
article, whether or not he knew or could have known of the defect ... [t]he 
producer shall be liable even if the article could not have been regarded as 
defective in light of the scientific and technological development at the time when 
he put the article into circulation."94 Thus, Article 1 creates a standard which 
imposes liability without regard to either fault95 or current scientific knowl-
edge.96 All the injured party must prove is that a defect existed at the time of 
injury and that the defective product caused the injury.97 When the injured 
party meets these two criteria, the law presumes the manufacturer to be liable.9B 
The burden then shifts to the manufacturer to rebut the presumption of 
liability.u9 
The drafters' purpose in enunciating a standard which imposes liability with-
out regard to fault or current scientific knowledge was to ensure adequate 
protection of the consumer.IOO Since injury, not fault, triggers the inquiry under 
this standard, the consumer need not fear that he will have to bear the cost of his 
injuries if the producer proves it was not at fault. lol The Commission asserts that 
this standard will not unjustifiably burden the producer. l02 The Commission 
reasons that the producer can lessen the impact of a liability without fault 
standard by passing the costs of damages and insurance payments to consum-
ers through higher product costS.103 One can best understand the EEC standard 
itself through an analysis of the basic terms which are components of the 
standard "producer," "article" and "defect." These terms, in effect, determine 
the application of the standard. l04 
1. Producer 
According to Article 2 of the Directive, the term "producer" encompasses all 
persons who manufacture finished goods or component parts as well as those 
who represent themselves as manufacturers of the goods by placing their name, 
trademark or other distinguishing features on the article. l05 The Directive 
/d. 
94. 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 7-8 (1979). 
95. Orban, supra note 6, at 377. 
96. Corrigan, supra note 17, at 118. 
97. Progress, supra note 34, at 13. 
98. Orban, supra note 6, at 388. 
99. ld. 
100. BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 13-14. 
101. ld. 
102. ld. 
103. 220.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 4 (1979). 
Liability on the part of the producer irrespective of fault ensures an appropriate solution to 
this problem in an age of increasing technicality, because he can include the expenditure which 
he incurs to cover this liability in his production costs when calculating the price and therefore 
divide it among all consumers of products which are of the same type but free from defects. 
104. Cf Orban, supra note 6, at 376-92 (analyzing the effect of the Directive through its terms). 
105. 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 8 (1979). 
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explicitly includes within the scope of the term "producer" any importer of 
goods into EEC countries for resale or similar purposes.106 In addition, Article 2 
focuses on the problem of identifying the prod ucer. This Article provides that in 
cases where the specific producer's identity is unknown to the consumer, the 
court should treat each supplier of the goods as the producer. l07 The court will 
infer a presumption that the supplier is the producer unless the supplier informs 
the claimant of the identity of the manufacturer within a reasonable time. l08 
While Article 2 appears to include any product manufacturer within its defini-
tion of producer, certain limitations on this term do exist. Article 5 states that a 
producer shall not be liable if he can prove one of the following three elements: 
(I) "that he did not put the article into circulation;"109 (2) "that, having regard to 
all the circumstances, the article was not defective when he put it into circula-
tion;"llo or (3) "that the article was neither produced for sale, hire or any other 
kind of distribution for the commercial purposes of the producer nor produced 
within the course of his business activities."111 The Preamble to the EEC 
Directive adds, howe\'er, that the presumption is to the contrary.112 The Direc-
tive authorizes the court to presume that the producer placed the article in 
circulation, that the article was defective when he put it into circulation and that 
he produced the article for sale, hire or other distribution. 113 Hence, the claim-
ant, once having shown injury from the defective product, i.e. causation, would 
have the benefit of an evidentiary shift of burden. 114 The producer, in order to 
insulate himself from liability, would have the affirmati\'e obligation to show that 
he did not create the defect,115 that the product was put into circulation against 
his will or that he did not produce the product for commercial purposes or 
within the course of his business activities. 116 
106. [d. "Any person who imports into the European community an article for resale or similar 
purpose shall be treated as its producer." !d. 
107. 220.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) preamble, at 8 (1979). "Where the producer of the article 
cannot be identified, each supplier of the article shall be treated as its producer unless he informs the 
injured person, within a reasonable time, of the identity of the producer or of the person who supplied 
him with the articles." !d. 
!d. 
108. !d. "Reasonable time" is an undefined term in the Directive. 
1 09. !d. at 8-9. 
110. !d. 
Ill. [d. 
112. [d., preamble, at 5. 
The producer is not liable where the defective product was put into circulation against his will 
or where it became defective only after he had put it into circulation and accordingly the defect 
did not originate in the production process; the presumption nevertheless is to the contrary 
unless he furnishes proof as to the exonerating circumstances. 
113. !d. 
114. Orban, supra note 6, at 388. 
115. !d. 
116. 22 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 5 (1979). See note 112 supra for the language used in the 
Directive. 
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The drafters chose the definition of "producer," which includes all persons 
involved in the process of producing a manufactured good, to protect the 
consumer. II 7 They believed that to adequately protect the consumer all those 
involved in the production process must be subject to liability. 11 S Those involved 
in the production process, according to the Directive, include any person who, 
even if he did not himself manufacture the defective article, represents himself 
as its producer by putting his distinguishing feature on the article. 119 The 
Directive includes suppliers of products among those involved in the production 
process when the consumer cannot identify the manufacturer. 12o This inclusion 
of suppliers under the term "producer" protects the consumer by substituting 
the liability of each supplier for the producer. 121 In order to escape liability, the 
supplier must reveal the identity of the producer. Consequently, the consumer 
would be able to recover from either the supplier or manufacturer when injured 
by an anonymous product. 122 
Importers also fall within the Directive's interpretation of those involved in the 
production process. 123 Although judicial proceedings in any non-EEC nation 
usually present the injured person with insurmountable difficulties, this ap-
proach aids consumer protection because the consumer would not have to go 
outside the EEC to obtain jurisdiction over the producer.124 The consumer 
would also receive inadequate protection if the importer could avoid liability by 
merely stating that he did not know the producer's identity or by providing the 
name of a producer who later proved to be insolvent. 125 Hence, the liability of 
the importer does not lapse when the consumer knows the producer's identity 
and can sue him, in contrast to the situation with suppliers under the Direc-
tive. 126 By including most of those involved in both the production and distribu-
tion processes, the Directive ensures that the consumer will have a party from 
whom he can recover in all inst.ances. Therefore, the expansive definition of 
"producer" and the limited defenses to liability which manufacturers can raise, 
serve to provide the injured consumer with a party from whom he can easily 
recover. 
Manufacturers assert that this expansive definition with narrow limitations on 
117. BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 14. 
118. Id. 
119. /d., "[TJhis provision is intended to cover primarily those undertakings, such as mail order 
firms, which have products, especially articles for mass consumption made by unspecified undertakings 
in accordance with precise instructions and sell them under their own name." /d. at 15. 
120. See note 107 supra. 
121. BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 15. This approach of including suppliers within the term producer 
should also provide an incentive for suppliers to require the marking of products with the producer's 
name before the product is put on the market. [d. 
122. /d. at 15. 
123. See note 106 supra. 
124. BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 15. 
125. /d. 
126. /d. 
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liability may be overly harsh on them. 127 They claim that this definition could, in 
certain instances, result in increased potential liability for those not involved in 
producing the final product. 12R For example, chemical producers would be 
subject to liability even though chemicals which they produce have become only 
components of a final product. 129 Industry sources complain that retailers and 
importers whose sole function is to distribute products manufactured by others 
will be held to the same standard of care as producers. 13o Manufacturers assert 
that this increase in potential liability for "producers" could generate a sig-
nificant rise in retail prices since many non-manufacturers would have to take 
insurance against risks to which they have not yet been exposed.1 31 
2. Article 
In contrast to the drafter's expansive use of the term "producer," the term 
"article," the terminology used to describe a manufacturer's product, is defined 
only in general terms and not in one specific section of the Directive. For 
example, the Preamble provides that liability extends "only to moveables which 
have been industrially produced."132 Article 1 adds that liability will also attach if 
the article is a component of an immovable piece of property.133 The only 
products which the Directive specifically excludes from this term are agricul-
tural, craft and artistic products. 134 Thus, only movable articles and those incor-
porated in immovable property fall within the scope of "article."135 Beyond this 
brief outline, the Directive adds little to one's understanding of this term. 
Because special rules exist in all Member States to cover defective, immovable 
property, such as buildings, the drafters decided to limit the scope of the term 
"article" only to movable property.136 Accordingly, they decided to include 
under the term "article" any movable objects used in the erection of buildings or 
/d. 
127. See' Liability Law's Bite, supra note 7, at 52, col. 2. 
128. /d. 
129. /d. 
130. See Lukomski, supra note 42, at 8, cols. 7-8. 
131. /d. 
132. 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 4 (1979). 
[Lliability should extend only to moveables which have been industrially produced; that as a 
result it is appropriate to exclude liability for agricultural craft and artistic products; that the 
liability provided for by this Directive should also apply to moveables which are used in the 
construction of buildings or are installed in buildings. 
133. [d. 
134. 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 8 (1979). "The producer is not liable under the provisions of 
this Directive if the defective article is a primary agricultural product, a craft or an artistic product when 
it is clear that it is not industrially produced." [d. 
135. BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 14. Because special rules exist in all EEC nations to cover defective, 
immovable property, such as buildings, the drafters felt no need to bring such property within the 
Directive's scope. [d. 
136. /d. 
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installed in buildings.137 The drafters have excluded artistic products and crafts 
from the Directive's coverage because they believed these products have a lower 
incidence of defects.13R Since less risk of harm exists for the consumer, he 
requires little protection from these products. 139 In addition, the drafters ex-
cluded agricultural products from the scope of the term "article" because these 
products are either consumed in their natural state or subject to strict interna-
tional and national processing requirements. 14o Thus, the Directive's coverage 
only applies to those goods which are mass produced on a commercial basis. 
Manufacturers contend that the Directive's general definition of "article" 
could cause inconsistencies in application of the standard due to a lack of a 
specific definition of "article."141 They argue that courts will have difficulty 
enunciating the distinction between industrially produced and other types of 
goods since the Directive provides no guidelines for defining this term. 142 Con-
sequently, each EEC country is free initially to define the term as it wishes. 143 
However, no reason exists to believe that the national courts and ultimately the 
European Court of Justice l44 will be better equipped than the Commission to 
develop a definition of the term "article."145 In fact, the Commission has spent 
more time developing this products liability standard than any court and should 
be able to give both manufacturers and consumers the succinct description of this 
standard which they need. 146 Without a clear definition of "article," manufactur-
ers argue that inconsistent application of the term "article" could result due to 
the Directive's general definition of this term. 147 
Manufacturers also believe that unfair treatment of manufacturers of compo-
nent parts may result from the Directive's inclusion of movables incorporated 
into immovable property.148 They argue that some manufacturers will not know 
how the final producer will use the parts and therefore should not be responsible 
for the finished product. 149 They also claim that liability should not exist if the 
137. Id. "Where, however, moveable objects are used in the erection of buildings or installed in 
buildings, the producer is liable in respect to these objects to the extent provided for in this directive." 
Id. 
138. See iii. at 14. This is true because these products are subject to continuous supervision by the 
craftsmen during the prod uction process. Id. 
139. !d. 
140. See iii. at 14. 
141. See Consumers Support, supra note 42, at 16. 
142. See iii. 
143. See Orban, supra note 6, at 388. 
144. One of the four principal institutions of the EEC, the European Court of]ustice (EC]) consists 
of nine judges appointed for terms of six years by common consent of the governments of the EEC 
nations. The ECl is responsible for interpreting and enforcing measures approved by the EEC. NOEL, 
supra note 28. at 2. 
145. Orban, supra note 6, at 388. 
146. !d. 
147. See iii. at 387. 
148. European Industry, supra note 42. at 15. 
149. Id. 
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components were perfectly constructed but not suited to the use made of them 
by the final producer. 15o This situation arises when the final producer requests a 
component part manufacturer to produce a part according to specifications 
which carry a defect in design. 151 Since component part manufacturers have 
little direct control over the final product, they believe liability should not extend 
to them if they have produced a part which does not deviate from the specifica-
tions of the contractor or final producer. 152 Consequently, manufacturers 
foresee two m~or problems with the general definition of "article." First, the lack 
of explicit guidelines for the use of this term could cause inconsistencies of 
application of the standard. Second, the inclusion of component parts under the 
term "article" could result in the unfair treatment of component manufacturers. 
3. Defect 
Before the Directive authorizes the court to impose the strict liability standard 
on a producer, the claimant must first prove that the defendant's property was 
defective and caused his injury.153 Article 4 defines a defective article as an 
article which "when being used for the purpose for which it is apparently 
intended ... does not provide for persons or property the safety which a person 
is entitled to expect, taking into account all the circumstances, including its 
presentation and the time at which it was put into circulation."154 The major 
factor in this definition is the legitimate safety expectations of the consumer. 155 
The Commission desired to protect the consumer and his property by using this 
type of a definition of "defect."156 In fact, the Directive's concept of "defect" 
coincides with the "consumer expectations" standard. 157 Under this standard, 
the Directive authorizes the court to impose liability on the manufacturer when 
the product injures the consumer in violation of his expectations of safety 
regarding the product. 15s The Directive's approach does not consider the rea-
150. /d. 
151. /d. 
152. /d. 
153. Orban, sUfrra note 6, at 388. 
154. 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 8 (1979). 
155. Hanotiau, sUfrra note 27, at 330. The Commission has declared that this section of the Directive 
means that "nobody can legitimately expect from a product which by its very nature carries a risk and 
which has been presented as such (instructions for use, labelling, publicity, etc.), a degree of safety which 
this product does and cannot possess, with the result that this product would not therefore be 
defective." Commission of the European Communities, Written Question No. 233/80 Oune 27, 1980) 
(available by writing to Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities to the United 
Nations, I Dag Hammorskjold Plaza, 245 East 47th Street, New York, NY 10017). Why this section of 
the Directive does not provide for state of the art defense remains unclear to this author. 
156. 220.]. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 5 (1979). "Whereas to protect the person and property of the 
consumer it is necessary, in determining the defectiveness of a product, to concentrate not on the fact 
that it is unfit for use but on the fact that it is unsafe; whereas this can only be a question of safety which 
objectively one is entitled to expect." 
157. Orban, sUfrra note 6, at 387. 
158. /d. at 387. 
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sonableness of the manufacturer in producing the article. 159 It uses objective 
criteria according to the circumstances in each case. 160 Thus, the Commission, in 
keeping with its goal of protecting the consumer, has chosen to define the term 
"defect" by reference to the consumer's expectations about the safety of a 
product. 161 
The Directive's adoption of the consumer expectations approach may create 
serious difficulties for manufacturers and courts. By following such an ap-
proach, the Directive eliminates the ability of a manufacturer to escape liability 
by claiming that he acted reasonably by demonstrating that the product in 
question met all scientific and legal requirements at the time of its development 
and causes injury thereafter. 162 This approach also focuses exclusively on the 
consumer who may have little idea of what level of safety a manufacturer can 
reasonably achieve in producing a new product. 163 The task lies with the courts to 
interpret the term "defect" based on the degree of safety the plaintiff was 
entitled to expect under the circumstances. 164 With the Directive furnishing no 
specific guidelines for a definition of defect, the potential for inconsistent deci-
sions exists. 165 In fact, the drafters have stated that since this term is so difficult 
to define, they will leave its definition to the courts. 166 Finally, the consumer 
expectations approach ignores differences among various types of defects, such 
as those resulting from faulty design and construction. 167 Therefore, manufac-
turers believe that the consumer expectations standard of the term "defect," 
which focuses solely on the consumer and his safety expectations, may cause 
more problems than it solves as courts attempt to apply and manufacturers 
attempt to adhere to this standard. 
B. UPLA 
In the opening statement of Section 104 (Basic Standards of Responsibility for 
Manufacturers) the UPLA provides that a product manufacturer will be subject 
159. /d. at 384. 
160. /d. at 387. 
161. See BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 15-16. 
162. Liability Law's Bite, supra note 7, at 52, col. 2. This approach will adversely affect drug producers 
and auto makers since all the risks inherent in a new product cannot be known until after years of 
testing, and even then without certainty. Id. 
163. Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 MISS. L.J. 825 (1973) [hereinafter cited 
as W:l.de, Nature of Strict Tort]. Professor Wade argues that the consumer expectation test alone is 
inadequate. "In many situations, particularly involving design matters, the consumer would not know 
what to expect, because he would have no idea how safe the product could be made." Id. at 829. Accord, 
Fischer, Product Liability - The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. REv. 339, 349-50 (1974); Vetri, supra note 
93, at 296-97 (1975). 
164. Orban, supra note 6, at 387. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. at 385. See also § III. B. 3 infra. 
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to liability when the injured party proves that a defect in the manufacturer's 
product proximately caused the harm suffered. 16s At first, the UPLA approach 
to manufacturer liability appears similar to that taken by the EEC, i.e. the 
application of strict liability in all products liability cases. 169 In reality, however, 
the UPLA illustrates a movement in the opposite direction. Instead.of applying a 
single standard of strict liability based on Section 402A of the Restatement 
(Second) of Torts,170 the UPLA combines the common law theories of negli-
gence and strict liability into one single product liability c1aim.l7l 
The drafters of the UPLA did not believe that strict liability should apply in all 
product defect cases. 172 Their belief stemmed from the fact that the drafters of 
Section 402A, the most widely applied strict liability standard,173 focused princi-
pally on the problem of faulty manufacturing of products and failed to consider 
other types of defects. 174 Specifically, the drafters of the UPLA noted that since 
the publication of Section 402A, courts have struggled to apply strict liability to 
cases involving defective design and a failure to adequately warn. 17S Therefore, 
after considering recent products liability claims based on theories of defective 
construction, defective design, failure to adeq uately warn or instruct and breach 
of express warranty, the drafters concluded that strict liability should apply in 
two situations. 176 First, it should apply when a defect results from the manufac-
turing process itself. 177 Second, it also should apply when the plaintiff proves 
that the manufacturer has breached an express warranty.17S In cases involving 
168. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,721 (§ 104 Code). "A product manufacturer is subject to liability to a 
claimant who proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the claimant's harm was proximately 
caused because the product was defective." ld. 
169. See § III. A infra. 
170. See note 18 supra. Since it was drafted in 1965, § 402A has become the single most im portant 
element of state product liability law in the United States. See Gerber & Conway, supra note 20, at 92-97. 
171. Dworkin, Product Liability Reform and Tlui Model Uniform Product Liability Act, 60 NEB. L. REv. 50, 
51 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Dworkin]. 
172. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). 
173. Davis, supra note 55, at 514; Orban, supra note 6, at 383. See also note 170 supra. 
174. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 402A, Appendix (1965) (most cases cited deal with defects in construction). 
175. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 
3d 413,573 P.2d 443,143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978); Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co., 76 N.J. 152, 
386 A.2d 816 (1978); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974). Jury 
instructions present a special problem when several theories of liability are used. See, e.g., Jorae v. 
Clinton Corp. Serv., 465 F. Supp. 952, 954-55 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Wade, On Product Liability: Design 
Defects and Tluiir Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 577 (1980). 
176. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). 
177. /d. 
178. /d. This Comment focuses on strict liability in instances of defective construction. It does not 
discuss the application of strict liability in breach of warranty cases. Historically, U.S. courts have almost 
unanimously imposed strict liability on product sellers whose representations about their products 
prove to be untrue and are relied upon by the purchaser to his detriment. See, e.g., Baxter v. Ford Motor 
Co., 179 Wash. 123,35 P.2d 1090 (1934); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 147 
N.E.2d 612 (1958); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965). The reasoning behind this 
imposition of strict liability was originally based on principles of deceit. NOEL & PHILLIPS, supra note I, at 
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design defects and a failure to warn, the UPLA provides that courts should apply 
a negligence rather than a strict liability standard. 179 The drafters intended to 
protect the interests of both manufacturers and consumers by dividing a prod-
ucts liability standard into four separate situations. 18o 
As discussed in regard to the EEC Directive, a full understanding of any 
products liability standard requires an examination of the component terms of 
that standard. Through such an examination, the application of the standard 
emerges. The ensuing discussion of the relevant terms of the UPLA reveals the 
application of the UPLA standard. 181 
1. Manufacturer 
Section 102 of the UPLA (Definitions) defines "product seller" as "any person 
or entity that is engaged in the business of selling products, whether the sale is 
for resale, or for use or consumption."182 This definition expressly includes 
man ufacturers, wholesalers, distributors and retailers. 183 Specifically excluded 
from this definition and thus from liability are sellers of real property, commer-
cial sellers of used, unrehabilitated products and any other party who leases a 
product without having an opportunity to inspect and discover defects in the 
product. 184 The UPLA then defines "manufacturers" as those product sellers 
18. Liability is now grounded in the fact that once a seller uses specific statements about a product'S 
quality to induce the buyer to purchase the product, he should be held to that representation. Id. at 21. 
The seller is liable regardless of whether any defect caused the injury so long as the purchaser relies on 
the representation and the reliance results in his injury. See, e.g., Huebert v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 208 
Kan. 720,494 P.2d 1210 (1972) (court held door manufacturer liable to repairman despite plaintiff's 
failure to prove existence of defect); Collins v. Uniroyal Inc., 126 N.J. Super. 401, 315 A.2d 30 (1973) 
(court held tire manufacturer liable for claims that tire would survive extraordinary road hazards; no 
defect was shown - only a failure to perform as warranted). It is important to note that the product 
seller may create an express warranty orally or in writing, as well as through any other action intended 
as a communication. See, e.g., Alan Wood Steel Co. v. Capital Equip. Enterprises, 39 Ill. App. 3d 48, 349 
N.E.2d 627 (1976); Larutan Corp. v. Magnolia Homes Mfg. Co., 190 Neb. 425, 209 N.W.2d 177 (1973). 
Id. 
The UPLA follows this general approach to express warranties. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,721. 
In order to determine that the product was unreasonably unsafe because it did not conform to 
an express warranty, the trier of fact must find that the claimant, or one acting on the 
claimant's behalf, relied on an express warranty made by the manufacturer or its agent about a 
material fact or facts concerning the product and this express warranty proved to be untrue. 
Cases involving express warranties usually arise in a commercial setting. Phillips, supra note 19, at 326. 
Therefore, § 2-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code which specifically treats express warranties is 
usually the law that controls. See Uf. However, the UPLA explicitly preempts all existing law governing 
matters within its coverage including the U.C.C. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,720 (§ 103 Analysis). The 
Act does not really alter § 2-313 of the Code. Compare UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,725 with U.C.C. 
§ 2-313 (1962 version). 
179. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). See generally Davis, supra note 55, at 540. 
180. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). 
181. See Orban, supra note 6, at 376-92. 
182. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,717 (§ 102 Code). 
183. ]d. 
184. Id. at 62,718-19 (§ 102 Analysis). The definition of "manufacturer" found its inspiration in ARIZ. 
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who originate and carry to fruition the production process, including makers of 
component parts, private producers who represent themselves as manufacturers 
and those who refurbish used products for resale. 185 Thus, for a "product seller" 
to be a "manufacturer," he must have participated in some aspect of the man-
ufacturing process. 186 Parties who are only tangentially related to the production 
process, such as shippers and importers, would not be subject to liability for 
merely handling the product. 187 They must do more than just serve as conduits 
for movement of the product through alteration or claim of participation in the 
manufacturing process to fall within the scope of the term "manufacturer."188 
By basing a definition on participation in the manufacturing process, the 
drafters have considered the interests of both consumers and manufacturers. 
The inclusion of all parties who participate in the manufacturing process pro-
tects the consumer's desire for recovery.189 The UPLA also considers the inter-
ests of the manufacturers, retailers and wholesalers by limiting liability to only 
those who actively participate in the production process and by succinctly de-
fining those parties which it considers to be "manufacturers."19o 
2. Product 
The drafters of the UPLA have focused on three separate factors in defining 
"product."191 The UPLA defines "product" as "any object possessing intrinsic 
value, capable of delivery either as an assembled whole or a component part or 
parts, and produced for introduction into trade or commerce. Human tissues 
and organs, including human blood and its components, are excluded from this 
term."I92 The UPLA thus focuses on three specific elements within this defini-
tion: intrinsic value, movability and production for commercial purposes.1 93 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-681(1) (Supp. 1978). "Manufacturer includes product seller who designs, pro-
duces, makes, fabricates. constructs or remanufactures the relevant product of component part of a 
product before its sale to a user or customer. It includes a product seller or entity not otherwise a 
manufacturer that holds itself out as a manufacturer." [d. 
185. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,718 (§ 102 Analysis). It is unclear whether this definition would 
include some of the genetic engineering products. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A 
comment f (1965). 
186. See, UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,717 (§ 102 Code). 
187. See, Uf. at 62,718 (§ 102 Analysis). 
188. [d. 
189. Cf id. at 62,714 (Introduction). One of the major goals of the Act was to insure the protection of 
consumers' rights and reasonable compensation for their injuries. !d. 
190. Cf it!.. at 62,714 (Criteria For the Act). (The drafters wished to provide a uniform set of product 
liability rules so that each party will know the rules judging them. In addition, the drafters wished to 
shift the cost of an accident from a claimant to a defendant only when the latter has been responsible for 
the injury.) 
191. See Hanotiau, supra note 27, at 331. 
192. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,717 (§ 102 Code). 
193. Cf id. at 62,719 (§ 102 Analysis). ("Therefore included are all goods, wares, merchandise and 
their components, as well as articles and commodities capable of delivery for introduction into trade or 
commerce.") 
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When all three of these elements exist, an object is a "product" under the 
UPLA.194 Because the UPLA clarifies the scope of the term "product" through 
the use of these three specific elements in the definition, inconsistent court 
interpretations should be infrequent.195 
3. Defect 
The UPLA, in its most striking departure from traditional products liability 
theory,196 does not attempt to define the scope of the term "defect" by a single 
standard.197 It defines the term "defect" by reference to four separate circum-
stances and applies negligence or strict liability depending on the situation. 19B 
A product may be proven defective if, and only if: 
(1) It was unreasonably unsafe in construction .. 
(2) It was unreasonably unsafe in design ... ; 
(3) It was unreasonably unsafe because adequate warnings or 
instructions were not provided ... ; or 
(4) It was unreasonably unsafe because it did not conform to the 
product seller's express warranty .... 199 
The Act utilizes the word "defective" as a general term including four types of 
unreasonably unsafe products.2oo A product does not become defective until the 
claimant proves that it was unreasonably safe under one or more of the four 
tests. 201 Thus, a product may possess a defect, e.g. loose screw, but is not 
defective until the claimant proves that this defect renders the product unrea-
sonably unsafe. 202 
The definition of unreasonably unsafe varies according to the claim alleged. 203 
The drafters have used two distinct means of defining unreasonably unsafe.204 
First, they have focused exclusively on the condition of the product itself, an 
approach based on the strict liability theory in Section 402A.205 Second, they 
have focused on both the condition of the product and the reasonableness of the 
manufacturer's actions under the circumstances, essentially an approach based 
on a negligence theory.206 The following discussion illustrates specifically how 
194. [d. 
195. See Orban, supra note 6, at 387-88. 
196. See notes 17 and 170 supra. For the complete text of § 402A, See also note 18 supra. 
197. Note, Standards of Product Seller Responsibility Under the Uniform Product Liability Act, 49 U. CIN. L. 
REv. 119, 120 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Standardsl. 
198. See text accompanying note 171 supra. 
199. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,721. For an explanation of strict liability as it applies to a breach of 
warranty claim, see note 178 supra. 
200. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). 
201. [d. 
202. See id. 
203. See id. at 62,721-24 (§ 104 Analysis). 
204. [d. 
205. [d. at 62,721-22 and 62,725-26 (§ 104 Analysis). 
206. [d. at 62,723-25 (§ 104 Analysis). 
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these two approaches relate to the four circumstances which render products 
unreasonably unsafe. 
a. The Product Was Unreasonably Unsafe in Construction 
A defect in a product's construction occurs when a failure during the man-
ufacturing process produces a structural flaw in a particular item of a product 
line. 207 If no one responsible for the manufacture of the product discovers the 
flaw during quality control or before purchase, the product reaches the con-
sumer in a "defective" condition. 208 Often these manufacturing errors are latent 
and therefore undiscoverable by mere observation. 209 When an injury occurs as 
the result of a manufacturing defect, the question, according to the UPLA, is 
whether the product was unreasonably unsafe. 210 
Section 1 04(a) of the UPLA provides that a product is "unreasonably unsafe in 
construction if the fact-finder determines that, at the time the product left the 
manufacturer's control it deviated in some material way from the manufacturer's 
design specifications or performance standards, or from otherwise identical 
units of the same prodUCt."211 Thus, the standard is, by definition, dependent on 
the manufacturer's own design and production specifications for the product. 212 
Consequently, the standard focuses exclusively on a comparison among the 
product as designed, the allegedly defective product, and other similar products 
created by the same manufacturing process.213 
The drafters justify the imposition of strict liability for construction defects on 
four grounds. 214 First, historically, American courts as far back as 1913215 have 
imposed strict liability for construction defects.216 Second, both.the Restatement 
207. Note, Standards, supra note 197, at 120. 
208. [d. 
209. See Henderson, supra note 93, at 1543; Phillips, supra note 19, at 344-45. 
210. See UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). 
211. [d. at 62,721 (§ 104 Code). 
212. One should note that the definition does not include issues concerning the manufacturer's 
quality control systems. Quality control was the focus of inquiry when construction defect cases were 
adjudicated under the negligence standard. The courts imposed liability if the manufacturer failed to 
use reasonable care in inspecting or testing his products to discover latent defects. See, I L. FRUMER & 
M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABIUTY § 6.01(1) (1979) [hereinafter cited as FRUMER & FRIEDMAN). Under 
the UPLA, this is still an important factor when the defendant is a product seller other than a 
manufacturer. See UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,727 (§ 105 Analysis). 
213. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,729 (§ 104 Analysis). For the drafters' rebuttal to criticism of a 
manufacturer defined standard, see, e.g., Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability 
Law - A Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 221, 225 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Twerski & Weinstein]. 
They believe that the manufacturer's self-im position of a higher standard will function as a shield 
against claims alleging liability in the more costly area of defective design. UPLA, supra note 22, at 
62,723-24 (§ 104 Analysis). Under this higher standard, a manufacturer may be liable for misdesign but 
does not place its whole product line at risk of being unreasonably unsafe in design. !d. at 62,723. 
214. !d. at 62,722. 
215. See, e.g., Mazzetti v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622,135 P. 633 (1913). 
216. Prosser, Assault, supra note 19, at 1106. 
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(Second) of Torts217 and the trend of American tort law follow this approach.21B 
Third, most product sellers are able to absorb the financial impact of strict 
liability for products which are defective in construction.219 Finally, the drafters 
believe that such a standard is necessary to protect the product user. 220 If 
negligence were the standard, the consumer would have a difficult time proving 
that the manufacturer should reasonably have known about a latent defect in 
one of many mass produced products.221 Taking all these factors into consider-
ation, the drafters determined strict liability to be the appropriate standard. 222 
The drafters took a different approach to injuries caused by defects in design. 
b. The Product Was Unreasonably Unsafe in Design 
The UPLA applies a negligence standard to claims of design defect. 223 This 
standard enunciates specific criteria for the trier of fact to evaluate in determin-
ing liability.224 Hence, the drafters avoided the problem225 of deciding between 
the "consumer expectations" test,22ti followed by the Directive, and the conven-
217. Dean Wade, who participated in the drafting of § 402A, has observed that the Restate-
ment authors were focusing on products liability cases dealing with defective construction rather than 
defective design or the failure to warn. Wade, Nature of Strict Tort, supra note 163, at 830. 
218. See Phillips, supra note 19, at 344-45 (citing cases). 
219. See FINAL REpORT, supra note 60, at VII-17. 
220. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,723 (§ 104 Analysis). One commentator has added that strict liability 
is appropriate because society expects mass produced products to be identical and possess no latent 
defects. Thus, courts should impose the strictest form of responsibility. Phillips, The Staruiard for 
Determining Defectiveness in Products Liability, 46 U. CIN. L. REv. 101, 104-05 (1977). 
221. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,723 (§ 104 Analysis). 
222. Id. at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). For a criticism of this approach to construction defects, see Owen, 
Rethinking the Policies of Strict Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681, 691-94 (1980). 
223. See UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). 
224. Id. See note 215 supra. 
225. The problem originally arose because the language of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 402A predicated liability on a product being "in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the 
user or consumer." Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 213, at 223 n.6. The term "defect" was meaningful 
within the context of a production defect case since the defect was identifiable by comparing the 
questionable product with the manufacturer's internal production standard. Id. In a design defect or 
failure to warn case, the term "defect" would not identify the standard against which the courts should 
judge a product. Id. The term "unreasonably dangerous" was appropriate for these cases since the 
concept of reasonableness required a balancing of risk-utility considerations. /d. Dean Wade in several 
influential articles identified those factors which the court should evaluate in setting the "reasonable-
ness" standard of product quality: 
(I) the usefulness and desirability of the product, (2) the availability of other and safer 
products to meet the same need, (3) the likelihood of injury and its probable seriousness, 
(4) the obviousness of the danger, (5) common knowledge and normal public expectation of 
the danger (particularly for established products), (6) the avoidability of injury by care in use of 
the product (including the effect of instructions or warnings), and (7) the ability to eliminate 
the danger without seriously impairing the usefulness of the product or making it unduly 
expensive. 
Wade, Strict Tort, supra note 19, at 17. For a slightly revised list of factors, see Wade, Nature of Strict Tort, 
supra note 163, at 837. 
226. Recently courts have expressed considerable support for a threshold test which does not require 
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tional "risk-utility" test,227 often advocated by some U.S. courtS. 228 Specifically, 
this negligence standard requires that the fact-finder balance two separate is-
sues.229 According to the UPLA standard, the fact-finder first must consider 
both the likelihood that the product could cause the claimant's injury or a similar 
one and the gravity of the injury should that likelihood materialize. 230 The 
that every design defect case undertake the complexities of risk-utility analysis. See, e.g., Welch v. 
Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252, 254 (5th Cir. 1973); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 
413,434-35,573 P.2d 443, 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 (1978); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 
S.W.2d 87, 92 (Tex. 1975). The thrust of the consumer expectation test is that when the manufacturer 
leads consumers to believe that a product will perform at a certain level and then disappoints those 
expectations, liability should ensue. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d at 429-30, 573 
P.2d at 454, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236. The most vociferous advocate of consumer expectations as the crucial 
liability factor in product liability law is Professor Sha po. See Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer 
Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liabilityfor ProdlJ£t Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974). See also, 
Montgomery & Owen, Riflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective ProdlJ£ts, 
27 S.C.L. REv. 803, 845-46 (1976); Twerski, From Defect to Cause to Comparative Fault - Rethinking Some 
ProdlJ£t Liability Concepts, 60 MARQ. L. REv. 297,312-15 (1977). 
227. The risk-utility test, commonly called the Wade-Keeton test of strict liability, applies the 
standard without reference to the scienter of the defendant. Professor Keeton has expressed the 
following formulation of the risk-utility test: 
[AJ product ought to be regarded as "unreasonably dangerous" at the time of sale if a 
reasonable man with knowledge of the product's condition, and an appreciation of all the risks 
found to exist by the jury at the time of trial, would not now market the product, or if he did 
market it, would at least market it pursuant to a different set of warnings and instructions as to 
its use .... Since the test is not one of negligence, it is not based upon the risks and dangers that 
the maker should have, in the exercise of ordinary care, known about. It is, rather, danger in 
fact, as that danger is found to be at the time of the trial that controls. 
Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 
SYRACUSE L. REv. 559, 568 (1969). 
At the outset some confusion existed about the utilization of risk-utility analysis in design defect 
legislation. Some courts believed that it merely re-introduced negligence into product liability actions. 
See, e.g., Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, 543 P.2d 209 (Alaska 1975); Cronin v. J.B.E. 
Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121,501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972); Glass v. Ford Motor Co., 123 N.J. 
Super. 599, 304 A.2d 562 (1973). 
This confusion was short-lived. The overwhelming majority of courts have applied risk-utility analysis 
in establishing design defect and failure to warn cases. See Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 
F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974); Borel v. Fireboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973); 
Welch v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973); Rogers v. Unimac Co., 115 Ariz. 304, 
565 P.2d 181 (1977); Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413,573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 
(1978); Rivera v. Rockford Mach. & Tool Co., 1 Ill. App. 3d 641, 274 N.E.2d 828 (1971); Moning v. 
Alfano, 400 Mich. 425, 254 N.W.2d 759 (1977); Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., 74 Mich. App. 532, 254 
N.W.2d 569 (1977); Blevins v. Cushman Motor, 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1977); Ferry v. Luther Mfg. Co., 
56 A.D.2d 703, 392 N.Y.S. 2d 521 (1977); Micallef v. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 248 N.E.2d 571,384 
N.Y.S. 2d 115 (1976); Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974); Henderson v. 
Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d 87 (Tex. 1974); Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1972). 
The significant outpouring of academic commentary aided the courts in recognizing the need to 
utilize the risk-utility theory. Although there may be occasional decisions which demonstrate confusion, 
see, e.g., Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978), there is considerable 
agreement as to which standard to apply. 
228. See Phillips, supra note 19, at 322-25; UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,723-24 (§ 104 Analysis). 
229. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). 
230. [d. 
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fact-finder must then balance against these considerations the difficulty that a 
manufacturer might experience in improving the safety of the product and any 
adverse effect that the alternative design might have on the usefulness of the 
product. 231 The UPLA also suggests particularly probative elements which 
courts should consider when applying this standard. These include: 
(1) [a]ny warnings and instructions provided with the product; 
(2) [t]he technological and practical feasibility of a product designed 
and manufactured so as to have prevented claimant's harm while 
substantially serving the likely user's expected needs; (3) [t]he effect 
of any proposed alternative design on the usefulness of the product; 
(4) [t]he comparative costs of producing, selling, using and maintain-
ing the product as designed; (5) [t]he new or additional harms that 
might have resulted if the product had been so alternatively de-
signed.232 
Thus, claimants have to show that the reasonable manufacturer knew or should 
have known of the risks inherent in the design. 233 They must also show that the 
manufacturer knew or should have known of the available practical alterna-
tives. 234 
The primary reason for the application of a negligence standard in design 
defect cases is that U.S. courts have rarely, if ever, imposed strict liability on 
manufacturers for products which are unreasonably unsafe in design.235 Where 
courts have applied a standard other than negligence, they usually have been 
unable to articulate a clear test to determine whether to impose liability.236 In 
addition, a manufacturer can almost always design a product more safely.237 
Therefore, the drafters believed a balancing of several specific factors as op-
231. Id. The basis of this general negligence standard is the famous "Learned Hand Formula" for 
negligence cases espoused by Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169, 
173 (2d Cir. 1947). Judge Hand stated that a person's duty to prevent injuries from an accident "is a 
function of three variables: (I) the probability that the accident will occur; (2) the gravity ofthe resulting 
injury, if it does; (3) the burden of adequate precautions." [d. 
232. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,721 (§ 104 Code). 
233. Dworkin, supra note 171, at 58. 
234. Id. 
235. See, UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,723 (§ 104 Analysis). See also Henderson, Manufacturers' Liability 
for Defective Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform, 56 N.C. L. REv. 625, 634-35 (1978). 
236. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,723 (§ 104 Analysis). Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 
844 (Tex. 1979) provides a paradigm of a court's struggle to apply strict liability principles in a design 
defect cllse. The case began in 1971, and the Supreme Court of Texas issued a number of opinions 
during the eight years in which Texas courts wrestled with the case. See also General Motors v. Turner, 
514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). The major problem preventing resolution of the case resulted 
from the difficulty courts had in enunciating which factors the jury should consider in determining 
liability. 
237. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,723 (§ 104 Analysis). A subjective test focusing only on the safety of 
the product follows the consumer expectation approach. See note 226 supra. The drafters explicitly 
rejected such an approach for design defects because the consumer would often have no knowledge in 
regard to the safe manufacturing of the product. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,724 (§ 104 Analysis). 
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posed to an automatic imposition of liability was necessary.23R 
c. The Product Was Unreasonably Unsafe Because Adequate Warnings or 
Instructions Were Not Provided 
343 
The UPLA also adopts a negligence standard with respect to products that are 
allegedly defective because the product seller failed to provide an adequate 
warning or instructions with its product. 239 Initially, the fact-finder must deter-
mine whether, at the time of production, a likelihood existed that the product 
could cause the claimant's specific or similar harm and whether the potential 
seriousness of that harm rendered the warning inadeq uate .240 The question then 
becomes whether the manufacturer could or should have provided the warnings 
that the claimant alleges would have enabled him to avoid his injury.241 Factors 
which the fact-finder should consider in evaluating the reasonableness of the 
manufacturer's conduct include: 
(I) [t]he manufacturer's ability, at the time of manufacture,242 to be 
aware of the product's danger and the nature of the potential harm; 
(2) [t]he manufacturer's ability to anticipate that the likely product 
user would be aware of the product's danger and the nature of the 
potential harm;243 (3) [t]he technological and practical feasibility of 
providing adequate warnings and instructions;244 (4) [t]he clarity 
238. See UPLA. supra note 22, at 62,723 (§ 104 Analysis). 
239. Id. at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). 
240. Schwartz, Initiatives, supra note 53, at 718. 
241. Id. 
242. Phillips, supra note 19, at 344·45. While attorneys have argued that under strict liability, as 
applied in warning cases, the manufacturer's ability to anticipate the danger before marketing the 
product is irrelevant. Most courts, however, hold that even under strict liability the manufacturer 
cannot be responsible for failing to warn of risks that were scientifically undiscoverable at the time of 
manufacture, i.e. development risks. See, e.g., O'Hare v. Merck & Co., 381 F.2d 286,291 (8th Cir. 1967); 
Wood ill v. Parke Davis & Co., 58 111. App. 3d 349, 353, 374 N.E.2d 683, 686·87 (1978). 
243. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,723 (§ 104 Analysis). Courts have held that the user's anticipated 
awareness of a product'S inherent risks is irrelevant to the duty to warn, at least under strict liability. See, 
e.g., Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 812 (9th Cir. 1974); Haugen v. Minnesota 
Mining & Mfg. Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 383·85, 550 P.2d 71, 74· 75 (1976). Many other courts, however, 
recognize that there may not be a duty to warn if the manufacturer can anticipate that the contemplated 
user will be aware of the product's risks. This circumstance exists when the risk is within the "common 
knowledge." See, e.g., Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 933·34,133 Cal. Rptr. 
483,484-85 (1976) (slingshot); Menard v. Newhall, 135 Vt. 53, 55·56, 373 A.2d 505, 506-07 (1977) (BB 
gun). It is also true where the manufacturer may fairly assume expertise on the part of the intended 
user sufficient to make him familiar with the product's risks. See, e.g., Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 
529 F.2d 457, 463·67 (5th Cir. 1976) (industrial chemical); Walter v. Valley, 363 So. 2d 1266,1270 (La. 
App. 1978) (professional power tool). 
244. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,721 (§ 104 Code). That warnings are relatively "easy" to provide, 
m the sense of labelling a product or including a warnings circular or instruction booklet with it 
encounters few practical difficulties, is widely assumed. See id. at 62,724 (§ 104 Analysis). One must not 
give this factor too much weight, however, by making the facile assumption that because warnings arc 
technically feasible they are simple to formulate or even desirable. See Note, Standards, supra note 197, at 
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and conspicuousness of the warnings or instructions that the man-
ufacturer provided;245 and (5) [t]he adequacy of the warnings or 
instructions that the manufacturer provided.246 
Therefore, the UPLA delineates specific factors which the fact-finder should 
consider to determine whether the manufacturer acted reasonably in a warning 
case. 
The UPLA limits this balancing approach to those dangers which are neither 
obvious247 nor involve unanticipated conduct by the consumer. 248 This approach 
127 n.39. The manufacturer faces very difficult choices in deciding whether a particular risk warrants a 
warning at all, and if so, how to phrase and emphasize it relative to warnings of other risks. /d. It must 
consider the effects that a warning will have on the perceptions and conduct of the user.ld. In making 
critical warnings decisions, the manufacturer must use language and psychology - tools unfamiliar to 
most engineers and the impact of which is less predictable than alternative designs or formulae. /d. 
Thus, providing effective warnings is no less difficult a problem than selecting among alternative 
designs, where the range of choice - and consequently the scope of responsibility - is narrowed by 
greater practical and economic limitations.ld. Courts should, consequently, not rely on failure to warn 
as an "easier" ground of liability. See generally Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher & Piehler, The Use and Abuse 
of Warnings in Product Liability - Design Defect Litigation Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited Twerski, Weinstein et al.]. 
245. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,721 (§ 104 Code). 
246. ld. 
247. /d. "A manufacturer shall not be liable for its failure to warn or instruct about dangers that are 
obvious, for 'product misuse' , , , ; or for alterations or modifications of the product which do not 
constitute 'reasonably anticipated conduct' . , ." ld, The effect of the "obviousness" of a risk on the 
manufacturer's duty to protect the user against it through warnings or design features has been a 
divisive issue. /d, While general recognition exists that the manufacturer has no duty to warn against 
"commonly known" dangers, the courts are widely split on the question of whether such a duty exists 
with respect to dangers that consumers cannot readily discover but that may have been "patent" to the 
particular claimant. ld. Many courts, particularly those relying on consumer expectations as the princi-
pal test of defect, apply a "patent danger rule" that absolves the manufacturer from responsibility to 
protect the user against such risks. ld. Commentators have criticized this rule as unrealistic, given the 
often inattentive manner in which products are used, and as inconsistent with strict liability principles. 
See Note, Standards, supra note 197, at 128 n.42. Consequently, a growing number of courts have limited 
the importance of the user's perception of the danger - a few, by making the user's perception entirely 
irrelevant, but most, by making the user's perception simply one of several factors to consider in 
determining whether the manufacturer should have provided a warning or assigned the product in a 
different way. /d. See also 2 LEGAL STUDY, supra note 60, at 30-33 (collecting cases). See generally I FRUMER 
& FRIEDMAN, supra note 212, § 8.04. This approach is, in fact, inconsistent with the growing trend 
rejecting the patent danger rule, at least in the warnings area. Since the purpose of a warning is to 
inform the user of that which he would not otherwise know, the manufacturer should not warn about 
things which the consumer does or should know. See Little, Products Liability - The Growing Uncertainty 
About Warnings, 12 FORUM 995,998 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Little]. While warnings against obvious 
hazards might have some "reminder" value, their proliferation could undermine public respect for, and 
thus the effectiveness of, warnings in general. UPLA, supra note 22, at 63,725 (§ 104 Analysis). For these 
reasons, the drafters of the UPLA state that its products liability standard should address the manufac-
turer's responsibility to protect users against obvious risks as a matter of proper design rather than one 
of adequate warnings. /d. 
248. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,721 (§ 104 Code). Profound confusion exists among the courts about 
whether manufacturers should warn against a foreseeable misuse or alteration if that misuse would 
constitute contributory negligence or assumption of the risk. See Little, supra note 247, at 1007-10. The 
UPLA's answer is that if product misuse occurs when the user does not act in a manner that a 
manufacturer would expect of an ordinary, reasonably prudent person, the trier of fact may determine 
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follows the premise that a manufacturer can expect the consumer to act as a 
reasonable person. 249 On the question of whom warnings or instructions must 
reach, the UPLA requires that the manufacturer direct his warnings to the actual 
user unless he has provided those warnings to one whom he can reasonably expect 
to control the risk or pass the warning on to the user (i.e., a physician or 
foreman).25o These considerations involving the scope of the duty to warn result 
from the drafters' recognition that some situations exist in which a manufacturer 
cannot transmit a warning to the actual user. 251 Therefore, the manufacturer 
that the party who misused the product should bear partial or sole responsibility for the resulting harm. 
UPLA, sUfrra note 22, at 62,737 (Optional Section). Consequently, manufacturers need not warn against 
dangers arising from misuse even if the manufacturer can foresee such misuse. /d. Manufacturers 
should warn against product alteration only if the alteration would constitute "reasonably anticipated 
conduct." [d. The act defines this phrase as "conduct which would be expected of an ordinary 
reasonably prudent person .... " [d. at 62,717 (§ 102 Code). Thus, the manufacturer has no duty to 
warn of risks resulting from foreseeable yet imprudent uses or alterations of the product. 
249. [d. at 62,737. See also Kimble v. Waste System International, 23 Wash. App. 331, 595 P.2d 569 
(1979); Twerski, Weinstein, et aI., sufrra note 244, at 514 (recognizing that warnings, to be truly effective, 
must be selective). 
250. UPLA, sufrra note 22, at 62,721 (§ 104 Code). 
A manufacturer is under an obligation to provide adequate warnings or instructions to the 
actual product user unless the manufacturer provided such warnings to a person who may be 
reasonably expected to assure that action is taken to avoid the harm, or that the risk of the 
harm is explained to the actual user. 
[d. The UPLA also discusses instances where an expert must supervise the product and where handling 
the products in bulk and individual warnings to each user or employee are not feasible. [d. "For 
products that may be legally used only by or under the supervision of a class of experts, warnings or 
instructions may be provided to the employer of the employee-claimant if there is no practical and 
feasible means of transmitting them to the employer-claimant." [d. 
251. [d. at 62,724-25 (§ 104 Analysis). See, e.g., Bryant v. Hercules Inc. 325 F. Supp. 241 (W.O. Ky. 
1970); Carmichael v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 58,95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971); Terhune v. A. H. Robbins Co., 
90 Wash. 2d 9, 577 P.2d 975 (1978). The UPLA recognizes the duty of a manufacturer to use 
reasonable care to inform consumers of latent dangers in its product that are discovered or become 
discoverable after the manufacturer markets the product. UPLA, sUfrra note 22, at 62,725 (§ 104 
Analysis). Several federal statutes impose a post-sale warning duty on manufacturers of household 
products, electronic equipment, motor vehicles and recreational boats. These statutes generally require 
notification to the appropriate agency and, in some cases, recall after discovering a hazard. See, e.g., 
National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,15 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1414 (Supp. 1970); Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, 15 U.S.c. § 2064 (1974); Radiation Control for Health and Safety Act of 1968, 
42 U.S.c. § 263g (1974); Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, 46 U.S.C. § 1464 (1975). A number of courts 
have recognized this duty under strict liability and negligence theories. See, e.g., Basko v. Sterling Drug, 
Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir. 1969) (drug); Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451 (2nd 
Cir.), cert. tkni£d, 396 U.S. 959 (1968) (airplane); Comstock v. General Motors Corp., 358 Mich. 163,98 
N.W.2d 627 (1959) (automobile dealer). 
The same basic factors considered by courts in determining whether a manufacturer has adequately 
discharged a pre-sale duty to warn also arise in evaluating his post sale conduct, his knowledge of or 
ability to discover the danger, its foreseeability, probability and seriousness and the difficulty of 
providing the warning. See UPLA,sufrra note 22, at 62,725 (§ 104 Analysis). Of special importance in the 
post-sale situation are the magnitude of the risk and the difficulty of providing the warning: the greater 
the risk and the potential harm, the greater the effort required of the manufacturer to reach present 
users. Factors bearing on the relative difficulty of providing the warning include I) the number of 
products sold; 2) the records available to the manufacturer of initial and subsequent purchases; 3) the 
continuing relationship (if any) between the manufacturer and users; and 4) the length of time since 
initial sale. /d. See generally Comment, Products Liability - Post Sale Warnings, 1978 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 49. 
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may give a warning or instructions to a person whom the manufacturer could 
reasonably expect to communicate the warning or to supervise the use of the 
product. 252 The drafters of the UPLA, by eliminating the need to warn of 
obvious dangers and by recognizing the limitations on manufacturers' ability to 
warn the actual user, have created a selective rather than a broad approach to 
warnings. 253 
The adequacy of warnings poses a disruptive threat to the stability of any 
proposed products liability standard.254 The reason for this effect is that courts 
consider warnings and instructions relatively easy to give255 and plaintiffs in-
creasingly use the failure to warn claim as a secondary theory of liability.256 
Thus, the drafters decided to consider several criteria in deciding whether a 
failure to warn exists. 257 They also adopted the majority view among U.S. state 
courts today that the duty to provide adequate warnings and instructions cannot 
extend beyond the data reasonably available at the time of production.25R The 
drafters believed this type of negligence approach would create a more definite 
and objective guide for courts.259 They were also convinced that this type of 
negligence approach would adequately protect the injured consumer while im-
posing a reasonable and clearly defined obligation on the manufacturer.26o 
Therefore, they rejected the harsher strict liability standard and opted for a 
252. This includes the manufacturer of tangible goods sold or handled in bulk or of other workplace 
products who may communicate warnings to the employer of the claimant when that is the only 
practical and feasible avenue for making a warning. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,725 (§ 104 Analysis). See 
also Reed v. Pennwalt Corp., 22 Wash. App. 718, 591 P.2d 478 (1979). One criteria not included in the 
UPLA comes from the "informed consent" doctrine applicable in many medical malpractice cases. See, 
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790-91 (D.C. Cir.), Ceft. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972); Cobbs v. 
Grant, 8 Cal. 3d 229, 245-46, 502 P.2d I, 11-12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505,515-16 (1972); Trogurn v. 
Fruchtman, 58 Wis. 2d 569, 603, 207 N.W.2d 297,314-15 (1973); Goldstein, For Harold Lasswell: Some 
Reflections on Human Dignity, Entrapment, Informed Consent, and thR Plea Bargain, 84 YALE L. J. 683, 691 
(1975); Plant, An Analysis of Informed Consent, 36 FORDHAM L. REv. 639 (1968). Specifically, this doctrine 
focuses on what a reasonable consumer would wish to know in formulating a decision. See, e.g., Miller v. 
Kennedy, II Wash. App. 272, 522 P.2d 852, aJf'd 85 Wash. 2d 151,530 P.2d 334 (1975) (where the 
relevant standard was defined as: "Would the patient as a human being considered this item in choosing 
his or her course of treatment?") /d. at 282, 522 P.-2d at 8~0. c<:mrts can easily paraphrase this standard to 
meet the product liability situation. Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 213, at 237. Once the claimant 
establishes that a warning is necessary, then the next question should be whether a reasonable consumer 
would want to have the information before deciding to utilize the product. Id. This test applies only to 
warnings whose function is solely to inform the consumer about non-reducible risks. /d. 
253. See Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 213, at 234. 
254. Phillips, supra note 19, at 325. 
255. See, e.g., West v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 197 N.W.2d 202, 211-12 (Iowa 1972) (referring 
to wire rope sling); Moran v. Faberge, Inc., 273 Md. 538, 543-44, 332 A.2d II, 15 (1975) (referring to 
bottle of cologne); Hamilton v. Motor Coach Indus., 569 S.W.2d 571, 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978) 
(referring to spring loaded air cylinder on a bus). 
256. Phillips, supra note 19, at 325. 
257. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,724 (§ 104 Analysis). 
258. Id. See, e.g., Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 790-96 (8th Cir. 
1977) (analyzing cases from numerous jurisdictions). 
259. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). 
260. See Uf. 
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standard which considers both the risks to the consumer and the actions of the 
manufacturer in light of reasonably available alternatives. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The EEC Directive and UPLA differ greatly in their respective considerations 
of the manufacturer's standard of liability to the consumer for injury from a 
defective product. The drafters of both wish to provide uniformity in products 
liability law.261 The drafters of both intend to protect the interests of manufac-
turers as well as consumers.262 The EEC Directive, according to manufacturers, 
does not fulfill this latter objective,263 whereas the UPLA does.264 Manufacturers 
feel that the Directive's standard disregards the interests of manufacturers by 
assuring the consumer of almost automatic recovery whenever he is injured by a 
product.265 This sentiment arises from the application of strict liability to all 
products liability claims and through the use of pro-consumer terms to define 
the application of that standard.266 The UPLA is more successful in protecting 
the interests of both the manufacturer and consumer.267 This success results 
from the combination of negligence and strict liability theories in its products 
liability standard along with succinct and objective delineations of the compo-
nent parts of that standard.26R 
Little doubt exists among manufacturers that an injured consumer will almost 
automatically recover if the Directive's strict liability standard becomes law.269 
Their fear of virtual automatic recovery under the Directive arises not just from 
the fact that the Directive uniformly applies a liability without fault standard.270 
The fear also comes from the application of this standard which is determined by 
the definition of the component parts of the standard.271 The expansive defini-
tion of "producer," which includes anyone who handles the product, could 
assure the injured claimant that he will always have someone from whom he can 
recover.272 The only affirmative defenses available to the manufacturer once the 
claimant has ,proven injury resulting from the product's defect, are: that the 
product was not defective at the time of manufacture, that he did not put the 
261. 22 O.J. EUR. Co MM. (No. C 271) 3-4 (1979); UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,714 (Introduction). 
262. 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 3-4 (1979); UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,714 (Introduction). 
263. See Liability Law's Bite, supra note 7, at 52, col. 2. 
264. Cf Orban, supra note 6, at 392 (declaring that the Directive proposes a standard more liberal 
than that existing in the United States today). 
265. Public Enterprises, supra note 42, at 14. 
266. ld. See also Orban, supra note 6, at 392. 
267. See Schwartz, lnihotives, supra note 53, at 725. 
268. Cf Orban, supra note 6, at 394 (declaring that the Directive provides a liberal attitude toward 
recovery through the use of its strict liability under all circumstances and its pro-consumer definition). 
269. Public Enterprises, supra note 42, at 14. 
270. See Liability Law's Bite, supra note 7, at 52, col. 2. 
271. ld. 
272. See BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 14-15. 
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article into circulation or that he did not intend to distribute the product 
commercially.273 These defenses appear to provide little relief in most products 
liability cases, and consequently the manufacturer could successfully raise them 
in only rare instances.274 However, these limited defenses attain great impor-
tance as the burden of proof shifts to the manufacturer once the claimant has 
proven injury resulting from the product's defect.275 
The only major limitation on a consum~r's recovery under the EEC standard 
lies with the term defect; the defective article which caused the injury must be 
industrially produced.276 Since the Directive only vaguely defines "defect", con-
fusion about its limiting effect could arise as courts begin to define it.277 Thus, 
the extent of its limitation of the manufacturer's liability is presently unknown. 
The use of a "consumer expectations" test to define the term "defect" ensures 
that the consumer's safety interests and not the actions of the manufacturer will 
be the court's primary focus. 27R Manufacturers thus conclude that the expansive 
definition of the term "producer," the vague definition of "article" and the 
explicitly pro-consumer definition of "defect" will provide that in virtually all 
defective products cases the courts will impose the Directive's liability without 
regard to fault standard on the manufacturer.279 
Manufacturers contend that an increase in potential liability under the Direc-
tive could force manufacturers, distributors, suppliers and importers to protect 
themselves by raising prices of their products by as much as twenty percent2RO in 
order to cover increased insurance premiums. In addition, manufacturers claim 
that these groups may hesitate to produce or handle newly marketed goods as a 
result of the wide application of this strict products liability standard.281 If this 
claim is even partially true, the Directive's ultimate effect may be that while the 
consumer will recover whenever injured by a product, he will have to pay for this 
guarantee of recovery in all circumstances through higher product prices and a 
decrease in the number of newly marketed goods, which is a major source of 
concern to industry.2R2 The UPLA offers an alternative, comprehensive prod-
ucts liability standard. The UPLA represents a uniform approach to products 
273. 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 8-9 (1979). 
274. See Orban, supra note 6, at 388. 
275. [d. 
276. 22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 8 (1979); see also text accompanying notes 127-137 supra. 
277. Orban, supra note 6, at 387. 
278. [d. 
279. See Public Enterprises, supra note 42, at 14. 
280. [d. Consumer groups strongly disagree with this estimate. For example, the consumers in the 
European Community Group, which represents the large majority of British consumers' organization, 
claim that the burden on industry for insurance would remain bearable if the Directive were to become 
law. See Britio;h Consumers Call for Producers to Be Made Liable for Development Rio;ks Under EEC Legislntinn, 
3062 EUROPE 15 (Jan. 23, 1981). 
281. Liability Law's Bite, supra note 7. at 52. col. 2. 
282. See iii. at 52. cols. 2-3. 
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liability law2R3 that also recognizes the disparate interests of consumers and 
manufacturers. 2H4 A products liability standard that includes both strict liability 
and negligence and an application of the standard based on objectively defined 
terms achieves this balancing of both consumers' and manufacturers' interests. 
The definition of the term "manufacturer" provides that only those who regularly 
engage in the production process will fall within its ambit and thus be subject to 
IiabiIity.2H5 The injured consumer will, therefore, be able to recover from the 
party that actually causes the defect because all those who alter the product face 
potential liability. However, not everyone who handles the product will face 
potential liability.2H6 The Act's definition of product also provides an unbiased 
approach favoring neither consumers nor manufacturers. The drafters used 
three factors to define the term "product": intrinsic value, movability and pro-
duction for commercial purposes. 287 The use of these three criteria ensures that 
an objective and predictable analysis will exist to define this term.288 
The UP LA also takes an objective approach incorporating both consumer and 
manufacturer perspectives in defining defect.289 Under the UPLA, no all-
encompassing definition of "defect" exists.29o Rather, the definition depends on 
the type of defect alleged. The method of defining a manufacturing defect lies in 
comparing the allegedly defective good with other ostensibly identical goods 
manufactured by the same process.291 If the comparison reveals a significant 
deviation from the manufacturer's specifications, the UPLA imposes strict liabil-
ity on the manufacturer.292 This approach protects the consumer's interest in 
recovery as he would have great difficulty proving that a defect existed at the 
time of manufacture. 293 It also considers the position of the manufacturer who 
can readily insure himself against the risk of production process defects. 294 
The UPLA proposes a balancing of specific factors to determine whether a 
design defect exists.295 This test compares the risk of injury to the consumer and 
the gravity of the harm should that risk materialize with the burden of produc-
ing a safer product on the manufacturer. 296 Such an approach incorporates the 
consumer's desire for the safest possible product with the manufacturer's con-
283. See Schwartz, Initiatives, supra note 52, at 717-19. 
284. Jd. at 715. 
285. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,718 (§ 102 Code). 
286. See text accompanying notes 185-88 supra. 
287. See UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,717 (§ 102 Code). 
288. See text accompanying notes 193-95 supra. 
289. See Schwartz, IniJiatives, supra note 53, at 717-19. 
290. See text accompanying notes 196-200 supra. 
291. UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,721 (§ 104 Code). 
292. /d. 
293. See id. at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). 
294. Id. 
295. /d. at 62,721 (§ 104 Code). 
296. /d. at 62,723 (§ 104 Analysis). 
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cern that an alternatively designed product be economically practicat297 Thus, in 
their desire to balance the interests of these two groups, the drafters concluded 
that a specifically defined negligence approach to design defects should exist.29B 
Complementing their approach in design defect cases, the drafters of the 
UPLA have employed a balancing test to define a defect arising from a failure to 
adequately warn or instruct.299 Both the likelihood of harm to the consumer and 
the gravity of the harm are again factors in this balancing test.300 Countervailing 
these consumer safety considerations' is the question of whether the manufac-
turer could and should have provided an adequate warning.301 Specific criteria 
for determining this question of fact exist in the UPLA.302 The consumer's 
desire to avoid serious harm is weighed in conjunction with the manufacturer's 
ability to provide a more effective warning under the circumstances through the 
use of a negligence approach comprised of specifically defined factors.303 Thus, 
the definitions of the component parts of the UPLA's standard reveal a conscious 
effort to incorporate both objective criteria and manufacturer and consumer 
perspectives into these terms. 
In its desire to establish a uniform products liability standard,304 the Commis-
sion of the EEC has chosen to apply a strict liability standard to all defective 
product claims.30s The application of the standard, as revealed through its 
consumer oriented terms, could provide the injured consumer with almost 
automatic recovery according to some manufacturers.306 Consequently, man-
ufacturers argue that this standard forces them to become guarantors of a 
product's safety.307 They contend that such an approach would be unfair for a 
number of reasons. First, unfairness would result from the fact that a manufac-
turer would be liable for any defect regardless of the care which he took to test 
and produce his product.30R This approach would not weigh the benefits to the 
public of a new product and thus deprives the public of potentially beneficial 
products, which may contain some risk.309 Second, application of the Directive's 
standard could subject anyone handling the product to potential liability. 310 This 
procedure would totally ignore the differing functions of distributors and pro-
297. See id. 
298. Id. 
299. !d. at 62,721 (§ 104 Code). 
300. Id. 
30!. !d. 
302. !d. 
303. Id. 
304. See OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 271) 3-4 (1979). 
305. See. iii. at 4. 
306. Public Enterprises, supra note 42, at 14. 
307. !d. 
308. European Industry, supra note 42, at 15. 
309. Id.; Liability Law's Bite, supra note 7, at 52, col. 2. 
310. See BULLETIN, supra note 7, at 3. 
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ducers.311 Distributors would have to insure themselves against product liability 
claims in exactly the same manner as producers, although they have no connec-
tion with the manufacture of a product. 312 Therefore, industry feels the EEC 
approach does not equitably balance its interests with those of the consumer.313 
In order to protect the interests of both consumers and manufacturers, the 
drafters of the Directive should have looked at the UPLA and employed a 
standard which recognizes the essential differences among defects due to faulty 
manufacture, improper design and failure to adequately warn. They should also 
have succinctly and objectively defined the terms of the standard which would 
enable courts to apply this standard in a way that favors neither the consumer 
nor the manufacturer. This approach to a products liability standard, as indi-
cated by the UPLA, ensures that uniformity can exist simultaneously with a 
products liability standard that considers fundamental differences among prod-
uct defects. By applying its standard of liability depending on the type of defect 
alleged, the UPLA assures that both manufacturer and consumer interests 
receive consideration. In manufacturing defect cases, the consumer expects the 
product he purchased to be identical to those from the same assembly line. 314 
The manufacturer can and presently does insure himself against such defects 
since they are readily calculable.315 Considering these factors, the drafters have 
imposed strict liability for manufacturing defects without regard to the rea-
sonableness of the manufacturer's actions.316 
In the case of defects due to faulty design and failure to adequately warn, the 
drafters believed that a balancing of interests is appropriate. 317 The UPLA 
considers both the utility of the product and its possible harmful effect on the 
consumer.3lR Thus, the UPLA balances the consumer's desire for protection 
against potential harm with the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions in 
light of the circumstances.31 " By present specific and objective guidelines for this 
balancing and for the defining of the other component parts of the standard, the 
drafters have provided courts with the means to uniformly apply this stan-
dard. 320 This specificity assures both the manufacturer and consumer that courts 
will have specific criteria and elements on which to focus in resolving a claim 
under the UPLA.321 A consistent application of this standard should result as 
311. Lukomski, supra note 42, at 20. col. I. 
312. Id. at 20, col. 7. 
313. See Liability Law's Bite, supra note 7, at 52, col. 3. 
314. See UPLA, supra note 22, at 62,722 (§ 104 Analysis). 
315. /d. 
316. Id. at 62.723 (§ 104 Analysis). 
317. Id. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
320. See Orban, supra note 6, at 386-87. 
321. /d. 
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courts will be applying the same criteria,322 Therefore, manufacturers and 
consumers alike will be able to predict how courts will apply this standard and 
can plan their behavior accordingly. This uniform standard of liability contained 
in the UPLA should, therefore, provide both manufacturers and consumers with 
an alternative to the Directive that equitably considers their disparate interests. 
U.S. manufacturers exporting products to Europe could be subjected to the 
toughest products liability law in the world if the EEC Proposed Directive 
becomes binding law.:J23 Under the Directive U.S. manufacturers would have to 
adhere to two different standards when marketing products in the United States 
and in Europe.32~ This double standard could have an adverse effect on U.S. 
manufacturers' desire to export goods to Europe. 325 Because of this possibility, 
U.S. manufacturers are reconsidering their approach to trade with European 
nations.326 Thus, the EEC should consider the potential effects of the Directive 
on both European and U.S. manufacturers. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Products liability law in Europe is rapidly changing. European nations are now 
beginning to apply strict liability principles to products liability cases. The EEC's 
Proposed Directive provides a specific example of this trend. The Directive 
applies strict liability in all defective products claims to achieve uniformity and to 
protect the interests of consumers and manufacturers alike. However, manufac-
turers believe that the effect of such a strict liability standard is to ensure 
consumer recovery in all products liability cases and to force manufacturers to 
become the guarantors of all product safety. 
The three key terms of the Directive's standard of liability, "producer," "arti-
cle" and "defect", determine the effect of the standard. Courts could interpret 
the Directive's use of "producer" and "defect" as an authorization to protect the 
consumer at the expense of the manufacturer. The term "article" has only a 
general definition under the Directive. Manufacturers argue that this approach 
to defining "article" could result in inconsistent interpretations or even a pro-
consumer approach. Thus, manufacturers believe that the Directive does not 
equitably protect the interests of both consumers and manufacturers. 
The UPLA, a codification of common law trends in U.S. products liability law, 
demonstrates that both uniformity and protection of consumers' and manufac-
turers' interests can result from a products liability standard that includes negli-
gence and strict liability theories. Similar to the Directive, the UPLA's standard 
322. [d. 
323. See INA, supra note 2, at 6. 
324. See Liability Law's Bite, supra note 7, at 52, col. I. 
325. [d. 
326. See INA, supra note 2, at 8, 
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has three key terms, "manufacturer," "product" and "defect." The drafters of 
the UPLA have defined all three in an objective and concise manner so that 
courts can readily apply them. In addition, they have divided the term "defect" 
into three separate circumstances with either a strict liability or negligence ap-
proach applicable to each. The UPLA's use of strict liability in manufacturing 
defect cases and its use of negligence in design defects and failure to adequately 
warn claims provide equitable treatment for both consumers and manufacturers. 
Perhaps the EEC should consider the UPLA's approach to products liability law 
before ratifying the Directive. "[I]f the EEC proposal, as presently drafted, is 
accepted ... it will only be a short time before obviously unfair results will come 
out of European courts, and a call for reform legislation will soon be heard in the 
European Community."327 
William T. Jebb II 
327. Corrigan, supra note 17, at lIB. 
